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Medical Device Artificial Intelligence:
The New Tort Frontier
Charlotte A. Tschider
The Machine is much, but it is not everything.1
– E. M. Forster
The medical device industry and new technology start-ups
have dramatically increased investment in artificial intelligence
(AI) applications, including diagnostic tools and AI-enabled
devices. These technologies have been positioned to reduce
climbing health costs while simultaneously improving health
outcomes. Technologies like AI-enabled surgical robots, AIenabled insulin pumps, and cancer detection applications hold
tremendous promise, yet without appropriate oversight, they will
likely pose major safety issues. While preventative safety measures
may reduce risk to patients using these technologies, effective
regulatory-tort regimes also permit recovery when preventative
solutions are insufficient.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
administrative agency responsible for overseeing the safety and
efficacy of medical devices, has not effectively addressed AI system
safety issues for its clearance processes. If the FDA cannot
reasonably reduce the risk of injury for AI-enabled medical
devices, injured patients should be able to rely on ex post recovery
options, as in products liability cases. However, the Medical
Device Amendments Act (MDA) of 1976 introduced an express
preemption clause that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to
 Charlotte A. Tschider is an Assistant Professor of Law for the Loyola University
School of Law and a member of the Beazley Institute for Health Law & Policy. The Author
would like to thank Wendy Netter Epstein, Jordan Paradise, Nadia Sawicki, Cynthia Ho,
Andrew Torrance, Blackford Middleton, W. Nicholson Price II, Andrew Selbst, the attendees
of the 2018 Wiet Law and the Biosciences Conference, and the 2019 ASLME Health Law
Professors conference attendees for their ideas and feedback in the early shaping and
development of this paper.
1. E.M.
FORSTER,
THE
MACHINE
STOPS
2
(1909),
https://www.ele.uri.edu/faculty/vetter/Other-stuff/The-Machine-Stops.pdf.
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nearly foreclose liability claims, based almost completely on the
comprehensiveness of FDA clearance review processes. At its
inception, MDA preemption aimed to balance consumer interests
in safe medical devices with efficient, consistent regulation to
promote innovation and reduce costs.
Although preemption remains an important mechanism for
balancing injury risks with device availability, the introduction of
AI software dramatically changes the risk profile for medical
devices. Due to the inherent opacity and changeability of AI
algorithms powering AI machines, it is nearly impossible to
predict all potential safety hazards a faulty AI system might pose
to patients. This Article identifies key preemption issues for AI
machines as they affect ex ante and ex post regulatory-tort
allocation, including actual FDA review for parallel claims,
bifurcation of software and device reviews, and dynamics of the
technology itself that may enable plaintiffs to avoid preemption.
This Author then recommends an alternative conception of the
regulatory-tort allocation for AI machines that will create a more
comprehensive and complementary safety and compensatory
model.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2018, Corindus Vascular Robotics made an
important announcement: the creation of a telerobotic surgical
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system.2 The CorPath surgical robot had conducted its first “inhuman” non-surgical health intervention for percutaneous
coronary intervention (PCI).3 PCI, or coronary angioplasty,
involves inserting a catheter into a patient’s coronary arteries and
placing a stent to promote blood flow.4 The medical procedure is
fairly routine, but CorPath’s solution is not: the surgical robot is
controlled remotely by a physician in a different geographic
location, aided by artificial intelligence (AI) technology.5 While
CorPath has the potential to transform healthcare, especially for
patients in developing countries and rural locations, it also has the
potential to cause serious injuries.
The AI healthcare industry is quickly developing as medical
device manufacturers take advantage of rapid advancements in AI
technologies, including machine learning, neural networking, and
deep learning. And the investment marketplace has taken note.
Forbes Insights has labeled AI and healthcare a “giant opportunity,”6
with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 28%
accelerating over the next five years, and 49% of that growth in
North America.7 Medical device companies are considered a
relatively sound investment, with margins consistently between
20–30%.8 With a backdrop of nearly 10% of venture capital in AI
technology development, it is no wonder that healthcare would see
2. Corindus’ Technology Successfully Used in World’s First-in-Human Telerobotic
Coronary
Intervention,
BUSINESSWIRE
(Dec.
6,
2018,
6:45
AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181206005067/en/Corindus%E2%80%99Technology-Successfully-Used-in-World%E2%80%99s-First-in-Human-TeleroboticCoronary-Intervention.
3. Id.
4. Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI or Angioplasty with Stent), HEART & STROKE
FOUND. OF CAN., https://www.heartandstroke.ca/heart/treatments/surgery-and-otherprocedures/percutaneous-coronary-intervention (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
5. See Corindus’ Technology Successfully Used in World’s First-in-Human Telerobotic
Coronary Intervention, supra note 2; Press Release, Corindus Vascular Robotics, Corindus
Receives FDA Clearance for First Automated Robotic Movement in technIQ™ Series for
CorPath GRX Platform (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.corindus.com/news-events/pressreleases/corindus-receives-fda-clearance-for-first-automated-robotic-movement-intechniq-series-for-corpath-grx-platform.
6. AI and Healthcare: A Giant Opportunity, FORBES INSIGHTS (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/02/11/ai-and-healthcare-a-giantopportunity/.
7. Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Market in Healthcare Sector 2019–2023,
BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 23, 2019, 12:52 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20190822005747/en/Global-Artificial-Intelligence-AI-Market-Healthcare-Sector.
8. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
SYSTEM 208 (2017), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/jun17_ch7.pdf.
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a share of that investment, approximated to grow to $6.6 billion
annually by 2021.9
Accompanying this investment opportunity is its share of
concerns. Pending lawsuits related to the Tesla self-driving car
have raised the profile of design flaws in AI, revealing the potential
for AI to cause catastrophic injury in any number of sectors.10 The
inherent “black-box” nature of AI algorithms, coupled with their
potential to self-learn, or what I will call dynamic inscrutability,
complicates the ability of both manufacturers and regulators to
actually understand whether these algorithms are safe and
effective.11 Healthcare is not immune from these issues, and the
FDA has not done much to assuage attendant concerns.12
The FDA, an agency that regulates nearly $2.4 trillion worth of
consumer goods, has regulated food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical
devices since 1938,13 with a more extensive role in medical device
oversight since 1976. As of 2019, the U.S. medical device market has
grown to $156 billion in medical devices,14 roughly 4–6% of total
U.S. spending on healthcare.15 According to Medicare spending
reports in 2014, hospitals spent $14 billion on implantable medical
devices for Medicare patients.16 Based on cost alone, the medical
device industry, and its potential impact on patients, is incredibly
significant.
As part of the 1976 Medical Devices Amendments Act (MDA),
which established a model for medical device oversight, Congress
included an express preemption provision barring civil liability
actions where injuries resulted from failure to meet requirements

9. See AI and Healthcare: A Giant Opportunity, supra note 6; Jeb Su, Venture Capital
Funding for Artificial Intelligence Startups Hit Record High in 2018, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2019, 2:58
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/02/12/venture-capital-fundingfor-artificial-intelligence-startups-hit-record-high-in-2018/.
10. Lance Eliot, Tesla Crash Lawsuit Nails the Achilles Heel of Driverless Cars, FORBES
(May 5, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/2019/05/05/teslacrash-lawsuit-nails-the-achilles-heel-of-driverless-cars/.
11. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015)
(introducing the concept of black-box medicine).
12. See infra Parts II and III and accompanying notes.
13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a.
14. U.S. Medical Device Market Reaches $156 Billion Mark, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Mar.
4, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-medical-devicemarket-reaches-156-billion-mark-300805696.html.
15. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 209.
16. Id. at 208.
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“different from” or “in addition to” federal requirements.17 At the
time, it was expected that the FDA could completely regulate the
medical device industry, a task that is increasingly more difficult
with a substantial variety of devices on the market, in larger
numbers, and with a wide range of potential threats and attendant
risks.18
This preemption language was reinforced in the Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr (1996)19 and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008)20 cases, where the
Supreme Court held that MDA expressly preempted both explicit
state statutory requirements and common law tort actions that are
different from or add to federal requirements. The net effect,
combined with an implied conflict preemption case, Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001),21 is that medical device injuries, at
least those caused by devices that have undergone extensive FDA
review, are nearly non-recoverable except in very limited
circumstances.22 Specifically, tort actions may only be brought
when non-compliance with a federal requirement is demonstrated
in pleadings: a so-called “parallel claim.”23
The combined challenges of a new technology environment that
could pose catastrophic injury to the public, a lack of extensive FDA
expertise and oversight, and a heavy preemption framework raise
major concerns for the future of patient safety and injury
compensation for AI machines. The future of technology
innovation depends heavily on confidence in the safety system.
Without an effective regulatory-tort allocation model,
manufacturers may not create life-saving devices due to upfront
regulatory compliance expense, and without regulatory oversight,
patients and physicians may forego cutting-edge solutions due to
safety concerns.
This Article responds to calls for examination of the tort system
with respect to software technologies using AI as a recent example
of a longstanding challenge: addressing the viability of tort

17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c–360n.
18. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 212 (citing JAMES C. ROBINSON, PURCHASING
MEDICAL INNOVATION (2015)).
19. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
20. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
21. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
22. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
23. See infra text accompanying note 128 (describing the parallel claim exception for
preemption).
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recovery for medical devices within the narrow margin left by the
Lohr, Riegel, and Buckman cases (the “preemption trilogy”).24 An
effective regulatory-tort allocation model, involving reinforcing
preventative and responsive legal modes, will collectively promote
innovation and reinforce consumer confidence by effectively bootstrapping safety measures and providing injury compensation. An
effective model should permit patients who will not benefit from
regulatory activity and otherwise may be left without
compensation for their injuries to successfully plead a case that
survives summary judgment, with the reasonable goal for parties
to engage in discovery related to actual device design failures.25
Although resolving the question of tort viability after preemption
is a valuable effort, this Author will not do so here.
Part I introduces the basics of AI software, specifically the
opaque and inscrutable “black-box” nature of AI algorithms,
paired with the dynamic and adaptive capacity of AI to self-learn.26
AI software is fundamentally different from historically regulated
medical devices, and these differences may inform where
opportunities are available for tort recovery within MDA
preemption doctrine. Part II recounts the current and insufficient
state of FDA regulation, including the structure and requirements
that form the premarket approval (PMA) process, the most
restrictive and comprehensive of FDA reviews and the principal
motivator for express preemption doctrine. I then discuss the
inherent regulatory limitations of FDA processes for preventing AI
medical device injuries, including structural limitations and design
insufficiencies. Part III discusses the nature of the regulatory-tort
bargain, specifically risk allocation, as the motivating factor for
preemption and identifies how tort recovery is central to this risk
allocation for emerging technologies like AI. Part IV applies these
arguments against the existing FDA processes to propose a threeparty inquiry, involving structural, design, and technology
24. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 429–
30 (2017).
25. I will note that this Article does not examine potential tort liability related to
labeling. Rather, it addresses concerns related to design-based injuries, largely because
failure to warn and other labeling claims have shown likely to be dismissed by circuit courts.
See, e.g., infra note 128.
26. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (introducing the concept of algorithms as
a black box and describing the range of uses in everyday life for algorithms in decisionmaking).
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considerations that courts can use to effectively analyze
preemption claims.27
I. AI TECHNOLOGY AND THE FDA
Although the term “artificial intelligence” calls to mind popular
science fiction, such as the advanced AI system from 2001: A Space
Odyssey, Hal, or the humanoid replicants in Blade Runner, current
AI algorithms function more like human-designed algorithms
combined with the ability to change and adapt themselves based
on changing data inputs and feedback loops.28 The most common
AI model used today is an algorithm or system of algorithms based
on data supplied, or machine learning.29 Machine learning is an
application of AI where a computer program, the machine-learning
utility or software, evaluates a large volume of data to identify
relationships between data elements, creating a machine-generated
algorithm informed by the data.30 Because the data collected will
likely change, this machine-generated algorithm updates
automatically as new data collected through use alter these
relationships, presumably making the algorithm more effective
over time.

27. Please note: this Article is designed to expand thinking on new technology,
especially software-based technologies reviewed by the FDA with respect to torts. AI offers
a useful example for illustrating one technology that the FDA has not yet adequately
regulated, as well as the likelihood of potential downstream injuries.
28. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968); BLADE RUNNER (Warner
Bros. 1982); Mindy Weisberger, Why You Shouldn’t Expect to See “Blade Runner” Replicants
Anytime Soon, LIVE SCI. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/60703-no-bladerunner-replicants-yet.html; Bobby Azarian, The Myth of Sentient Machines, PSYCH. TODAY
(June 1, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mind-in-the-machine/
201606/the-myth-sentient-machines. Although Elon Musk and the late Stephen Hawking
have warned of AI’s dangers in sentience, it seems unlikely that machines able to make
decisions on more than one topic, “artificial general intelligence,” could be years or decades
in the future. Still, these machines may not operate with human-like intelligence. Anthony
Cuthbertson, Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking Warn of Artificial Intelligence Arms Race,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:09 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ai-asilomar-principlesartificial-intelligence-elon-musk-550525; How Far Away Are We Really from Artificial
Intelligence?, TECHNATIVE (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.technative.io/how-far-away-arewe-really-from-artificial-intelligence/.
29. Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/.
30. Libby Kinsey, A Machine Learning Primer, MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 2016),
https://medium.com/@libbykinsey/a-machine-learning-primer-6d7b5a96a3b0.
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One example of an AI-enabled medical device is the QuantX
platform.31 QuantX reviews breast cancer images using an
increasing collection of data related to these images to recommend
when breast cancer seems likely, according to imaging scans.32
QuantX requires radiologists to validate diagnoses, prompting a
lower potential risk to patients and correspondingly less
comprehensive Food and Drug Administration review,33 but it is
not hard to imagine systems in the future that either automate
analysis or provide these diagnoses to medical practitioners who
do not have an oncology specialization.34
When an AI utility, or software program, leverages computing
power to evaluate relationships between data elements in a big data
repository, the AI software may identify previously unconsidered
or novel relationships, which create a complex, system-generated
algorithm.35 The QuantX system, for example, is likely trained on
images with positive breast cancer diagnoses and images with
negative breast cancer diagnoses. As more accurate diagnoses and
images are fed into the system, the AI algorithm should become
more accurate through self-learning.36 These images may include
hundreds or thousands of unique data points related to the images,
captured with a variety of machines and machine operators, across
a wide population of human beings with variable physiological
characteristics.37
31. QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS, Efficiently Incorporating AI into the Clinical Workflow
(2019), https://www.qlarityimaging.com/next-gen-integration.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. It should be noted that QuantX has been designated as Class II, a lower-risk
classification, likely because of the radiologist’s involvement in diagnosis. Berkman Sahiner,
Aria Pezeshk & Nicholas Petrick, An Update on FDA Perspectives for Machine Learning in
Medical Image Interpretation, SIIM (2018), https://cdn.ymaws.com/siim.org/resource/
resmgr/mimi18/presentations/18cmimi-sahiner.pdf.
35. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 7 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/
documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf.
36. Alejandro Rodríguez-Ruiz, Elizabeth Krupinski, Jan-Jurre Mordang, Kathy
Schilling, Sylvia H. Heywang-Köbrunner, Ioannis Sechopoulos & Ritse M. Mann, Detection
of Breast Cancer with Mammography: Effect of an Artificial Intelligence Support System, 290
RADIOLOGY 1, 6 (2018).
37. Id. at 2. Although this example involves over 100 images, many imaging solutions
include thousands of images. See, e.g., Wenya Linda Bi, Ahmed Hosny, Matthew B. Schabath,
Maryellen L. Giger, Nicolai J. Birkbak, Alireza Mehrtash, Tavis Allison, Omar Arnaout,
Christopher Abbosh, Ian F. Dunn, Raymond H. Mak, Rulla M. Tamimi, Clare M. Tempany,
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To be reasonably accurate, algorithms must accommodate
human variations as well as different radiological imaging
practices. The result is a highly complex algorithm or algorithms,
which must adapt and change to integrate new data as it is
supplied.38 This continuous updating, or tuning, may be labeled
dynamic for our purposes, as the QuantX algorithm in operation
when it was first released has learned, through new data, to create
the algorithm used today. Humans, however, are not usually
involved in this change: AI learns independently of its creator.
A. Artificial Intelligence Systems Create Dynamically
Inscrutable Algorithms
Machine learning may be implemented as supervised or
unsupervised learning systems. In supervised learning systems,
data scientists are involved in labeling and otherwise restricting the
function of the machine learning utility.39 In unsupervised learning
systems, unlike supervised learning systems, data scientists do not
restrict utility function to a specific model, and the machine
learning utility can leverage any data available to it.40
When a machine learning utility has fewer constraints, it creates
algorithms that may be highly complex and partially or completely
inscrutable to data scientists—an inherent opacity.41 The net effect
of unsupervised learning systems, which are frequently used in AIenabled medical devices like QuantX, is that creators can no longer
understand their creations as the algorithms themselves become
complex and unreadable.42 When creators can no longer
understand how their creations work, and those creations have

Charles Swanton, Udo Hoffmann, Lawrence H. Schwartz, Robert J. Gillies, Raymond Y.
Huang & Hugo J.W.L. Aerts, Artificial Intelligence in Cancer Imaging: Clinical Challenges and
Applications, 69 CA: CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 127, 133 tbl.1 (2019) (listing the number of
images associated with specific cancer applications).
38. Tom Grigg, Algorithmic Complexity [101], MEDIUM (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/algorithmic-complexity-101-28b567cc335b.
39. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., supra note 35, at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Inscrutability, or opacity, results from complex interrelated rules as well as some
of the techniques employed when designing the algorithm. These algorithms are
distinguished from strategic opacity, as in trade secrecy. Price, supra note 24, at 430.
42. Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 4 (2016).
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materially changed, new risks to patient safety arise, often after
FDA approval.43
Algorithmic complexity may result not only from the vast
multitude of relationships between data elements but also from the
relevant weightings of the elements, or the number of “neurons” in
the case of a more advanced AI neural network.44 Neural networks
are more advanced AI systems than their machine learning
relatives. Neurons, or nodes, in a network make calculations based
on their relationship to other neurons, often within several layers
of intelligence. Because deep learning involves more complex
neural networks with several layers, some of which may be hidden,
it can identify more complex relationships between data in the
layers.45
Medical researchers are increasingly using neural networks to
solve more complex imaging problems.46 One example, led by
Massachusetts General, required the use of 50,000 MRI brain scans
just to train a single neural network, which has resulted in better,
faster, and more accurate imaging processes.47 Neural networks
and deep learning networks exhibit an even higher level of
complexity due to weighting for data sets within a number of
43. FDA regulatory processes involve both pre- and postmarket activities. Where a
premarket activity, such as the PMA process, might not catch a potential issue until the
algorithm has learned on real-world data, postmarket activity should be able to detect and
respond to these issues. Often the FDA requires any number of actions after manufacturer
notification, such as deploying a fix, stopping additional sales, or recalling devices. See U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Postmarket Information—Device Surveillance and Reporting Processes
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/human-factors-and-medicaldevices/postmarket-information-device-surveillance-and-reporting-processes.
Unfortunately, if functionality is inscrutable due to inherent technical complexity, even data
scientists may not be able to determine whether an issue will arise and how to minimize
harm to patients. See Burrell, supra note 42, at 5.
44. Neurons are specific functioning units of a neural network, a more advanced
version of an AI utility. See Mingzhe Chen, Ursula Challita, Walid Saad, Changchuan Yin &
Mérouane Debbah, Artificial Neural Networks-Based Machine Learning for Wireless Networks: A
Tutorial, 21 IEEE COMMC’NS SURVS. TUTORIALS 3039, 3058 (2019); Brian K. Lee, Justin Lessler
& Elizabeth A. Stuart, Improving Propensity Score Weighting Using Machine Learning, 29 STAT.
MED. 337 (2010).
45. See Fei Jiang, Yong Jiang, Hui Zhiuh, Yi Dong, Hao Li, Sufeng Ma, Yilong Wang,
Qiang Dong, Haipeng Shen & Yongjun Wang, Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present
and Future, 2 STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 237 (2017).
46. Jeff Lagasse, FDA Approves First AI Tool for Detecting Retinopathy, NIH Shows
Machine Learning Success in Imaging, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/fda-approves-first-ai-tool-detectingretinopathy-nih-shows-machine-learning-success-imaging.
47. Id.
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layers.48 Systems with a greater number of layers generally produce
more accurate decisions and more complex algorithms.
B. Infrastructure Complexity Increases Overall Artificial
Intelligence Complexity
Algorithmic complexity not only results from ephemeral data
element relationships and weightings, but it also results from the
complexity of the code and machine communication itself. As
suggested by Alan Turing, computers require a more efficient
mechanism for communication in high-powered systems via highlevel coding languages.49 The development of complex computer
codes from the 1960s through the 1980s enabled these operations,
continuing to increase efficiency in recent years.50 Modern machine
learning utilities often leverage Python, C++, R, JavaScript, and
Julia coding languages.51 Machines must also communicate with
other machines, specifically when an AI system directs an
additional medical device or computer system to function in some
way, an artificially intelligent machine (AI machine).52
Machine to machine communication, or M2M, adds further
complexity to inherent coding and algorithmic complexity.53
Because human languages are highly inefficient for computers
using higher order mathematics, M2M languages enable computers
to communicate more efficiently using a shorthand computerreadable language, especially for devices connected to oneanother.54 When algorithms prompt activity within a computer
48. See Burrell, supra note 42, at 5.
49. See Stephen Muggleton, Alan Turing and the Development of Artificial Intelligence, 27
AI COMMC’NS 3, 4 (2014).
50. Id.
51. Nick Heath, GitHub: The Top 10 Programming Languages for Machine Learning,
TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/github-the-top-10programming-languages-for-machine-learning/.
52. The Author adopts this name to distinguish between AI standalone system and
physical devices directed remotely by AI, which may or may not include the robotics field.
For purposes of this Article, AI machine means an AI-enabled medical device inclusive of
diagnostic applications and connected physical devices with AI capabilities. It should be
noted that historically AI has been analyzed principally as “robotics,” although “AI
machine” as it is used in this Article is inclusive of robotics applications, such as surgical
robots.
53. John Breeden II, What Is M2M, and Why Is It the Future of Code?, GCN (Mar. 22,
2013), https://gcn.com/articles/2013/03/22/m2m-future-of-code.aspx.
54. Jen Clark, What is M2M Technology, IBM BLOG (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/what-is-m2m-technology/.
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system or to standalone devices, such as Internet of Things (IoT)
devices or robotics, M2M is used to deliver the message over
wireless or cellular-enabled networks.55 This technology makes it
feasible to communicate between a central system housing AIgenerated algorithms and receiving devices that are distributed
remotely.56 Further, interconnected devices running on the same
network may communicate with each other, such as an insulin
pump sharing information with a pacemaker.57 Figure 1 illustrates
this infrastructure.

FIGURE 1: AI MEDICAL DEVICE INFRASTRUCTURE

C. Artificial Intelligence Is Created by Humans and Compromised
by Humans
Although AI is designed to be inherently self-learning,
distinctly human choices in their design dramatically affect

55. Andrew Parker, Intelligent Connectivity: The Fusion of 5G, AI and IoT, GSMA (Sept.
7, 2018), https://www.gsma.com/iot/news/intelligent-connectivity-5g-ai-iot/; Chen et al.,
supra note 44.
56. See Chen et al., supra note 44 at 3043.
57. PLASMATIC TECHS., Smart Home Interoperability: The Key Hurdles, IOT FOR ALL (Mar.
1, 2019), https://www.iotforall.com/smart-home-interoperability-key-hurdles/.
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performance.58 Designing an AI system is no trivial task, filled with
choices that can increase or decrease safety.59 Data scientists not
only must make choices in designing the AI software but must also
develop methods for the software to identify changes or receive
feedback to “tune” the system. Facially, therefore, it is impossible
to determine which algorithms are high quality or safe.60 Without
effective feedback loops, the software cannot become more
effective or be safe for new patient populations.
Relevant choices for machine learning applications include
code selection, database structure, training data sets, rule design,
machine learning training, and ongoing system updates.61
Technology that integrates AI into its functionality requires design,
testing, and user feedback—more comprehensively and
continuously than existing FDA technology submitted for review.62
Further, AI machines may be exposed to cybersecurity risks at a
greater frequency: the dynamic inscrutability of AI systems makes
them even more vulnerable to cyberattacks because unauthorized
changes to the underlying data sets or the algorithm may not be
noticeable until after injuries occur.63
When AI utilities run on geographically dispersed, or remote,
systems, additional selections must be made, including the
communication languages and models for transmitting data and
direction to devices and transmitting data from devices to the AI
58. See Chen et al., supra note 44, at 3049.
59. Richard Harris, How Can We Be Sure Artificial Intelligence Is Safe for Medical Use?,
NPR (Apr. 14, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/14/
711775543/how-can-we-be-sure-artificial-intelligence-is-safe-for-medical-use;
Why
AI
Safety?, MACH. INTEL. RSCH. INST., https://intelligence.org/why-ai-safety/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2021).
60. See Price, supra note 24, at 433.
61. Martin Zinkevich, Rules of Machine Learning: Best Practices for ML Engineering,
Invited
Talk at Reliable Mach.
Learning in
the Wild (Dec. 2016),
http://martin.zinkevich.org/rules_of_ml/rules_of_ml.pdf.
62. Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 241 (2017); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 104 (2017) (describing the lack of standards setting bodies for identifying
appropriate testing thresholds).
63. Meg King & Jacob Rosen, The Real Challenges of Artificial Intelligence: Automating
Cyber Attacks, WILSON CTR.: CTRL FORWARD (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
blog-post/the-real-challenges-artificial-intelligence-automating-cyber-attacks; see, e.g., Cade
Metz & Craig S. Smith, Warnings of a Dark Side to A.I. in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/science/health-medicine-artificialintelligence.html (describing the prevalence of adversarial attacks); see also Charlotte A.
Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health Marketplace, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1
(2017) (describing limitations in the FDA’s review of potential cybersecurity risks).
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software to create a complete ecosystem.64 Further, additional
choices must be made for receiving devices, such as how much data
devices will retain in their local cache, whether limited decisions
can be made locally and without connectivity to the primary AI
software, and which data produced by the device should be
transmitted back to central AI systems.65 In robotics, systems must
effectively, safely, and reliably operate any number of kinetic
activities as a robot moves, performs tasks, or interacts with human
beings using a variety of sensors and actuators.66
Each of these choices can enhance or reduce effectiveness,
safety, and reliability. The volume and quality of data collected and
used for an AI system can dramatically affect the system’s function
for specific communities and populations.67 Without sufficient data
volume or representation from different communities, data may
produce discriminatory or ineffective results. For example, the
algorithm may have learned from data not representative of a
specific patient sub-group or economic background, suggesting a
diagnosis inaccurate for a specific group.68 Training data, on which
algorithms are developed, may codify discrimination present in the
data supplied to the system.69 It may also discriminate by proxy,
64. Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence, 5
SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 179–85 (2018) (describing the IoT architecture, including big data
solutions, remote connectivity, and remote AI utility use); see also Chen et al., supra note 44.
65. Gretchen Hoffman, Being Smart about Product Design with IoT and AI,
ALTITUDEINC.COM, https://www.altitudeinc.com/being-smart-about-product-design-withiot-and-ai/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
66. See Chen et al., supra note 44, at 3049.
67. Bernard Marr, Why AI Would Be Nothing Without Big Data, FORBES (Jun. 9, 2017,
12:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/06/09/why-ai-would-benothing-without-big-data/; Joshua New, AI Needs Better Data, Not Just More Data, CTR. FOR
DATA INNOVATION (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/03/ai-needsbetter-data-not-just-more-data/.
68. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 91–
94 (2019). Professor Nicholson Price describes AI algorithmic training in high-resource
contexts, such as university medical centers, and describes the challenge of applying these
algorithms to environments with lower comparative resources and differing patient
populations, which could result in less accurate algorithmic decision-making. Id. However,
other structural limitations not mentioned in Professor Price’s article could also apply to a
provider’s choice to use such an algorithm. For example, the status of algorithmic use as a
standard of care for purposes of insurance and avoiding malpractice might reinforce use of
inaccurate algorithmic decision-making if the algorithm is endorsed due to its use in a
higher-context environment.
69. Paul Teich, Artificial Intelligence Can Reinforce Bias, Cloud Giants Announce Tools for
AI Fairness, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulteich/
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even when data do not directly identify groups likely to endure
discrimination.70
Poorly designed AI software may also be vulnerable to security
compromise, leading to safety issues.71 Because data from any
number of sources drive algorithmic function, if data are modified
in an unauthorized manner, the algorithm itself can function
incorrectly, giving instructions causing downstream system or
device malfunction.72 For example, a brain stimulation device’s
software could be remotely updated or given automated direction
by an AI algorithm. If the data are changed in an unauthorized
manner, AI software instructions could increase the electrical
stimulus beyond its typical thresholds, causing brain damage.
Similarly, during an availability attack, when data used to direct
system functions are made unavailable, the system dependent on
AI might not work, for example in the middle of a surgery assisted
or completed using surgical robotics.
In AI diagnostic applications, such as QuantX, the potential for
cyber-kinetic attacks or poor AI design causing direct physical
injury may be less likely.73 However, a physician with limited
cancer knowledge relying on the tool itself may still make an
inaccurate diagnosis and pursue medical interventions, such as
radiation or chemotherapy, that could harm an otherwise healthy
patient.74 For AI directing machine activity, such as automated
2018/09/24/artificial-intelligence-can-reinforce-bias-cloud-giants-announce-tools-for-aifairness/.
70. Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and
Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENVER U.L. REV. 87, 98–100 (2018); see
generally Daniel Schwarcz & Anya Prince, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2020) (describing the likelihood of
discrimination when big data and highly powerful AI systems can result in discriminatory
application of decisions to protected groups).
71. See generally Tschider, supra note 64 (raising issues related to security under FDA
reviews, including lack of specific rules, the superimposition of past models including panel
reviews, the modulation of device classification through separate component review, and
failure to review from the position of actual risk with distributed technology architectures).
Cybersecurity is an essential aspect of good AI, in that poor cybersecurity will likely
compromise the data feeding algorithms and their subsequent recommendations.
72. See Tschider, supra note 70, at 118–20.
73. Tutt describes simple mistakes, such as bugs or typos that could result in, for
example, discriminatory effect. See Tutt, supra note 62, at 106.
74. See Jasmine Just, Overdiagnosis: When Finding Cancer Can Do More Harm than Good,
CANCER RSCH. UK (Mar. 6, 2018), https://scienceblog.cancerresearchuk.org/2018/03/06/
overdiagnosis-when-finding-cancer-can-do-more-harm-than-good/ (describing the role of

1566

1567

Medical Device Artificial Intelligence

surgery or AI-enabled updates to implanted or affixed medical
devices, physical harms are more likely. The impact of any issues,
including unintentional AI issues, could mean catastrophic injuries
for patients.75
Consider, for example, a connected insulin pump like the
DreaMed Diabetes’ Advisor Pro.76 Advisor Pro, like many AI
solutions, uses cloud technology, a distributed technology system
that connects over the open internet,77 making it potentially
susceptible to cyber-kinetic attacks as well as AI design safety
issues. Insulin pumps like the Advisor Pro deliver insulin direct to
the body via a user interface the patient controls, and the interface
also provides recommendations for insulin delivery to the
physician.78 If the system tells a patient that the patient’s blood
sugar is high, it is unlikely that a patient will question whether the
reading is accurate.79 Although the FDA seems to view the patient
as quality control, equipped to spot machine failures, automation
bias and trained incapacity are far more likely to promote a false
sense of security.80
cancer screening and subsequent treatment for benign cancers as impacting human health);
Screening: How Overdiagnosis and Other Harms Can Undermine the Benefits,
HEALTHNEWSREVIEW.ORG,
https://www.healthnewsreview.org/screening-howoverdiagnosis-and-other-harms-can-undermine-the-benefits/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
75. Olaf J. Groth, Mark J. Nitzberg & Stuart J. Russell, Opinion, AI Algorithms Need
FDA-Style Drug Trials, WIRED (Aug. 15, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/aialgorithms-need-drug-trials/.
76. Amanda Pedersen, How AI Is Personalizing Insulin Therapy for Diabetes Patients,
MED. DEVICE + DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (June 18, 2018), https://www.mddionline.com/how-aipersonalizing-insulin-therapy-diabetes-patients.
77. Advisor Pro, DREAMED, https://dreamed-diabetes.com/advisor/ (last visited
May 1, 2021).
78. Id.
79. The FDA has illustrated this view of “human as quality control” via its AI
diagnostic software approvals. If a physician is providing a diagnosis based on AI, rather
than automating the diagnosis, usually this software will receive a lower classification.
However, even professionals may fall victim to automation bias or trained incapacity.
Trained incapacity results from the regression of humans when they have a tool or
alternative knowledge that permits them to gain greater efficiency or shift human attention.
See generally Erin Wais, Trained Incapacity: Thorstein Veblen and Kenneth Burke, 2 J. KENNETH
BURKE SOC’Y (2005) (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE
STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS (1914)), https://www.kbjournal.org/wais.
80. Automation bias usually results from reliance on technology, where an individual
takes less personal responsibility due to their trust and dependence on something other than
their own judgment. Additionally, over time individuals begin to rely more heavily on
computers to perform tasks they previously performed. These two conditions
simultaneously create a situation ripe for injuries to occur. Human interfaces and judgment

1567

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

Diabetes, like cancer, is a key area of focus for much of medical
device development; the possibility of a bionic pancreas, for
example, could dramatically change how diabetes patients live. In
2018, Beta Bionics received an Investigational Device Exception
(IDE), which is required to clinically test a device on humans, for
its iLet Bionic Pancreas System, an artificial pancreas powered by
AI and designed for children and adults living with Type-1
diabetes.81 Of course, a bionic pancreas by design would function
with little engagement from the patient at all,82 potentially
introducing additional safety hazards.
D. Artificial Intelligence Systems Cannot Be Made Safe by ProcessBased Solutions
Although the FDA has expressed an interest in AI-enabled
medical devices, including diagnostic systems and implanted or
affixed devices, the FDA has not effectively developed any specific
plan or direction for regulating them.83 It has similarly failed to
implement specific rules or best practices related to medical device
cybersecurity. The most concrete of its recent contributions for
manufacturers was in the form of an AI discussion paper describing
AI system design and the agency’s new Digital Health Software
Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, a pilot program for medical
devices that use AI software.84

do not cure safety issues presented by AI machines. See Cosima Gretton, The Dangers of AI in
Health Care: Risk Homeostasis and Automation Bias, MEDIUM (June 24, 2017),
https://towardsdatascience.com/the-dangers-of-ai-in-health-care-risk-homeostasis-andautomation-bias-148477a9080f.
81. Omar Ford, Combining AI and CGM to Make a Bionic Pancreas, MED. DEVICE +
DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (May 22, 2018), https://www.mddionline.com/combining-ai-and-cgmmake-bionic-pancreas; Beta Bionics Receives IDE Approval From the FDA to Begin a Home-Use
Clinical Trial Testing the a New Bionic Pancreas System, DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY, https://drugdev.com/beta-bionics-receives-ide-approval-from-the-fda-to-begin-a-home-use-clinicaltrial-testing-the-a-new-bionic-pancreas-system/.
82. Press Release, Am. Diabetes Assoc., The iLet Bionic Pancreas Increased Time in
Range for Adults with Type 1 Diabetes (June 8, 2019), https://www.diabetes.org/
newsroom/press-releases/2019/the-ilet-bionic-pancreas.
83. See Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 241.
84. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) 4 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/
download. It should be noted that both of these contributions advance a “hands-off”
approach to FDA device clearance, rather than increased requirements the FDA will review
as part of a more comprehensive premarket approval (PMA) process.
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While technical best practices may exist, AI software is typically
fit for specific uses and designed to be contextually applied, which
can make recipe-like legal requirements destined to fail.85
Engineers and data scientists design AI software to fulfill specific
goals or tasks of a relevant adjacent system with any number of
rules, and infrastructure design depends on the purpose and use of
the system.86 For example, AI software that supports medical
diagnosis will be designed differently, both in system and in
process, than AI software for self-driving cars, which have very
different tasks to perform.87 Even when AI infrastructure is used for
a variety of different AI implementations, the software itself will be
context-specific to its implementation.
The FDA appears to have rejected this concept, focusing on
process-based solutions rather than individual review. The AI
discussion paper created by the FDA, which was first published for
feedback in April 2019, describes best practices for machinelearning enabled diagnostic systems, more specifically for imagebased systems.88 The discussion paper envisions a pre-certification
process, consistent with the FDA’s pre-certification software
process launched in January 2019, by which organizations might
implement a Total Product Life Cycle regulatory approach (TPLC)
to AI-ML-based software as a medical device.89 In it, the FDA
85. Training data and system design must be tailored to specific goals or outcomes.
Without specific goals or outcomes designed in a system, AI systems cannot train or continue
to improve when performing tasks or rendering specific decisions.
86. B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence.
87. See Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning for Medical Diagnostics—4 Current
Applications, EMERJ A.I. RSCH. (Mar. 14, 2020), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/
machine-learning-medical-diagnostics-4-current-applications/; Alex Davies, The WIRED
Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/
guide-self-driving-cars/; Tonya Riley, Get Ready, This Year Your Next Job Interview May Be
with an A.I. Robot, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/aijob-recruiting-tools-offered-by-hirevue-mya-other-start-ups.html. AI utilities are designed
specifically to fulfill or maximize certain codified goals. For example, medical diagnostics
might be designed to identify breast cancer from mammogram images, while a self-driving
car might be designed to identify and follow traffic signals, and an AI employment
application might be designed to detect false narratives or measure reliability. See generally
Jim Guszcza, Smarter Together: Why Artificial Intelligence Needs Human-Centered Design,
DELOITTE REV., January 2018, at 36, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/
us/collections/issue-22/DI_Deloitte-Review-22.pdf.
88. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 3–4.
89. Id. at 3. The Total Product Life Cycle Regulatory approach is a model wherein
organizations implement process-based solutions, such as testing procedures, requirements

1569

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

proposes a similar type of approach to its existing model for quality
process facility inspection, where the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) visits and inspects facilities planned for manufacturing a
specific device.90
The TPLC maps well onto the facility inspection portion of
existing FDA approval, which includes both a review of the design
of the device itself (including associated clinical trial results and
proposed labeling) and a review of the facility and quality system
processes for producing it.91 Although the TPLC should improve
the overall safety profile for some AI software, the process will not
effectively support a detailed, use-specific device design review.92
A singular model for premarket review cannot provide
direction for other medical devices or even for different types of
diagnostic systems, simply because the methods used to create safe
and reliable diagnostic imaging systems would not necessarily be
effective for other systems.93 In short, process-based models are
part of, rather than a comprehensive solution for, effective FDA
review. For example, diagnostic software for colon cancer using
medical chart data might be designed differently than diagnostic
software using mammogram images for breast cancer.94 Depending
development, and AI modeling. Id. at 4. In this approach, administrative agencies like the
FDA can regulate the organization’s practices rather than specific products. Id.
90. The facility inspection process, conducted by a third party or the FDA, assesses the
quality system implemented in the manufacturing facility for higher risk medical devices
and reviews proposed compliance with appropriate requirements from a manufacturing
perspective. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDE TO INSPECTIONS OF QUALITY SYSTEMS
(1999), https://www.fda.gov/files/Guide-to-Inspections-of-Quality-Systems.pdf; U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ACCREDITED PERSONS INSPECTION PROGRAM (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/third-party-inspection-devices/accreditedpersons-inspection-program. These programs adhere to Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMP), general established practices that are reviewed in addition to specific quality process
requirements for the device being manufactured.
91. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 8–9. The TPLC even uses a
surrogate for GMP, Good Machine Learning Practices (GMLP), to echo the standardization
of GMP. Id. at 9. It should be noted, however, that even GMP require special adaptation to
the device being manufactured in a traditional facility. This makes intuitive sense: a
pacemaker might require different processes for quality enforcement of specific leads used
to stimulate the heart than the port for an insulin pump.
92. Id. at 8–9.
93. See Copeland, supra note 86; Charles Aunger, Should the FDA Regulate AI?, FORBES
(Aug. 14, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/08/14/
should-the-fda-regulate-al/.
94. Different AI techniques can provide different results with the same goals and
application, let alone different goals. See Guy Nir, Davood Karimi, S. Larry Goldenberg,
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on the target population and relative frequency of a disease’s
occurrence or variability, the system might also be designed
differently to ensure a high level of reliability.95 Although the TPLC
might be tremendously useful as a starting point for machine
learning diagnostic software, the variables selected by data
scientists in creating any AI system, as well as the system’s interface
and direction of physical devices, are highly specific to the device
and population at hand. This inherent “fit-for-purpose,” or
customized nature of software design, especially for AI, does not
lend itself well to a broad, manufacturer-level certification process
as the primary model for safety and efficacy.
Although industry best practices might inform system design,
they also cannot completely prevent algorithmic discrimination,
privacy, or safety issues specific to the AI software’s
implementation, as designed. AI algorithms might integrate certain
principles, but they necessarily must be designed, tested, and
continuously monitored for their specific purposes and codified
goals. Algorithmic outputs are typically personalized with respect
to the user and change dynamically, unless it is “locked,” or
rendered non-learning, at the time of FDA submission, which
dramatically reduces its potential efficacy.96
The customized aspect of AI combined with its dynamic
inscrutability for unlocked algorithms poses unique challenges for
Ladan Fazli, Brian F. Skinnider, Peyman Tavassoli, Dmitry Turbin, Carlos F. Villamil, Gang
Wang, Darby J.S. Thompson, Peter C. Black & Septimiu E. Salcudean, Comparison of Artificial
Intelligence Techniques to Evaluate Performance of a Classifier for Automatic Grading of Prostate
Cancer from Digitized Histopathologic Images, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 2–4 (2019),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2727273. In Nir et al.’s
comparative analysis, prostate cancer benefitted from certain patient CV models and multiexpert data rather than histopathologic images (a digitized camera image from a microscope
of cancer cells). Id. at 8.
95. W. Nicholson Price’s arguments related to high-context and low-context
environments is particularly salient here, as systems are not easily transferrable from one
population to another. See Price, supra note 68. This is precisely why the FDA requires specific
labeling that adheres to the test populations from clinical trials in traditional medical device
approvals, and while it permits off-label use, off-label use cannot be promoted by medical
device manufacturers, and physicians are not protected from medical malpractice related to
off-label use, unless off-label use reflects the standard of care. See Christopher M. Wittich,
Christopher M. Burkle & William L. Lanier, Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About
Off-Label
Drug
Use,
87
MAYO
CLINIC
PROC.
982,
986–87
(2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538391/pdf/main.pdf.
96. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84, at 3 n.7; Jiang et al., supra note 45, at
241. The most effective algorithms require updated data be supplied so that the algorithm is
able to learn from a greater variety of data inputs. Id. This renders algorithms static versus
dynamic.
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effective preventative oversight,97 as what is a perfectly reasonable
design for one AI software application may not appropriately
acknowledge issues for another.98 With AI, potential risks can only
be anticipated to a limited extent because the algorithm making the
decisions is a completely different algorithm in clinical trials than
when used post-trial.99 The world is a clinical trial for health AI, full
of unanticipated issues unlikely to arise in a limited clinical-trial
scheme and difficult to anticipate at the time of FDA submission.100
Countless human decisions result in automated decisionmaking via AI algorithms, including those powering low-risk and
high-risk applications, from diagnostic software to surgical
robotics. The depth of human ingenuity paired with machine
computer power and longitudinal extensibility will revolutionize
life as we know it. While the risks are high, the incentives and
potential outcomes are similarly high. The most crucial step is
finding the appropriate balance for incentivizing development
97. Aunger, supra note 93.
98. For example, many training data sets might contain information that is more or
less useful for specific uses and may result in less useful functionality. See Drew Roselli,
Jeanna Matthews & Nisha Talagala, Managing Bias in AI, COMPANION PROC. 2019 WORLD
WIDE WEB CONF., May 2019, at 539, https://people.clarkson.edu/~jmatthew/publications/
ManagingBiasInAI_CAMERAREADY.pdf.
99. The FDA has focused on developing an acceptable framework for adapting clinical
trials for AI machines, including two formal guidance documents. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., ADAPTIVE DESIGNS FOR MEDICAL DEVICE CLINICAL STUDIES (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/adaptivedesigns-medical-device-clinical-studies; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF REAL-WORLD
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/use-realworld-evidence-support-regulatory-decision-making-medical-devices; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICE DEVELOPMENT TOOLS (MDDT) (2021), https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/science-and-research-medical-devices/medical-device-developmenttools-mddt. These, respectively, permit broader indications for use based on accumulated
information after the trial phases are over to bolster clinical trial data and the ability to alter
the clinical trial to some extent based on pre-planned and expected deviations. These
guidance documents do signal that the FDA understands, at least facially, the development
of AI technologies. However, they do not address design-specific issues.
100. The model of “the world as a clinical trial” is a common model for medical
products that would prove too expensive to fully test in a clinical trial environment, such as
vaccines. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 453 (2010). The FDA has also
embarked on useful efforts to better gather and use data for purposes of improving device
functionality. One example of this effort is the NEST platform, which “generate[s] evidence
across the total product lifecycle of medical devices.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NATIONAL
EVALUATION SYSTEM FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY (NEST) (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/cdrh-reports/national-evaluation-system-health-technology-nest. These types of
platforms will be indispensable for AI machines.
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while reducing potential issues. Where preventative regulation is
undesirable or unlikely to provide safe and effective medical
devices, the tort system may provide a complementary opportunity
to reinforce safety while providing injury compensation.
II. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION AND TORT PREEMPTION
The medical device preemption trilogy of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
(1996), Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001), and Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc. (2008) dramatically reduced the probability of
plaintiffs successfully recovering in tort for injuries caused by
medical device use.101 In total, the preemption trilogy has nearly
foreclosed any opportunity for patient recovery when medical
devices have undergone a complete FDA review, with only a
narrow opportunity to successfully bring a tort claim that survives
summary judgment.102
A. The Medical Devices Amendments Act of 1976 and Subsequent
Preemption Cases Have Nearly Foreclosed Tort Recovery
In response to widespread and well-publicized pharmaceutical
and medical device injuries, John F. Kennedy championed passage
of two amendments that would focus on more comprehensive
regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices—the Drug
Amendments of 1962 and a medical device-focused amendment.103
However, the thalidomide disaster, where a pharmaceutical used
for morning sickness resulted in serious birth defects for more than
10,000 children, prompted Congress to prioritize passing the Drug
Amendments of 1962.104
In 1976, Congress finally passed the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA) against a backdrop of catastrophic Dalkon

101. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2007).
102. The Author focuses on the potential for a plaintiff to bring a tort action that
survives preemption. However, this Article does not address a variety of other medical
device tort complexities, such as heightened pleadings standards combined with the inability
to produce highly specific claims due to confidentiality commitments between the Food and
Drug Administration and manufacturers.
103. INST. OF MED., PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION 4 (Theresa Wizemann ed., 2010),
https://www.nap.edu/read/12960/chapter/1#ii.
104. Id.; Thalidomide, SCI. MUSEUM (Dec. 11, 2019), http://broughttolife.
sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/themes/controversies/thalidomide.
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Shield injuries, where an intrauterine device used by 2.2 million
women caused pelvic infection, infertility, and death.105 At the time,
although Congress was aiming to provide greater protection for
medical device consumers,106 Congress could not have anticipated
the potential challenges of regulating the diverse and fast-growing
medical device industry.107
The MDA established a PMA process for medical devices,108 a
substantial process involving a “multivolume application.”109 As
part of this act, Congress statutorily integrated a risk management
model into its ambits, based on a classification system of Class I,
Class II, and Class III (from lowest to highest risk).110 Additionally,
Congress charged the FDA to determine the safety and efficacy of
a device “weighing any probable benefit to health . . . against any
probable risk of injury or illness from . . . use.”111 This combined
approach illustrated that medical device safety and efficacy review
should take into account both potential risk to individuals using
such devices and (1) actual device users, (2) recommended or
suggested labeling, (3) cost and benefit analysis, and (4) device
reliability.112
The preemption provision that accompanied the tiering system
made sense from the perspective of a fully regulating central
agency, if Congress believed that the FDA would have the
appropriate resources to fully regulate safety and efficacy for the
105. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); CDC, Elevated Risk of Pelvic
Inflammatory Disease Among Women Using the Dalkon Shield, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. (May 06, 1983), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000072.htm.
106. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Because the MDA did not, on its
own, provide a compensatory remedy, it is hard to believe that the MDA was intended to
preempt state torts quickly following a high-profile tragedy. Id.
107. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, The Medical Device Amendments of 1976: The Statute that Went
Awry, FDA L. BLOG (June 3, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2013/06/the-medicaldevice-amendments-of-1976-the-statute-that-went-awry/; see MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 219.
108. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360c).
109. See Riegel, 522 U.S. at 317–18.
110. Id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE CLASSIFICATION PANELS (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/deviceclassification-panels. Practically speaking, classifications are proposed by the applicant for a
particular medical device based on definitions for specific families of devices in the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) and predicate devices previously approved. Each classification
integrates general controls further illustrated in the CFR for all devices, with special controls
offered for Class II and Class III devices, respectively.
111. Medical Device Amendments § 513(a)(2)(C).
112. Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2020).
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medical device sector. They could not have anticipated that the U.S.
medical device sector would grow to become one of the biggest
industries in healthcare, with 7,000 medical device companies
accounting for some $136 billion in annual sales as of 2015, or 45%
of the global medical device market.113
In addition to establishing the classification system and the
PMA and abbreviated 510(k) processes for medical device
clearance, Congress also included a limited preemption clause in
the MDA.114 Under the MDA preemption clause, plaintiffs may not
recover for injuries resulting from a “requirement . . . which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
[the MDA], and . . . which relates to the safety or effectiveness of
the device.”115
This preemption clause seemed, at its passage, to embrace the
role of the FDA as primary regulator for the medical device
industry by barring state laws that establish different or additional
state requirements beyond federal requirements.116 The operative
function of this preemption clause, then, was to dismiss patient
claims, usually as a negligence or negligence per se tort, claiming
injury related to non-compliance with state law.117 However, at the
time of passage, Congress could not have anticipated how
preemption law under the MDA would develop.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) was the first case to fully address
preemption related to FDA regulation of medical devices. In Lohr,
the Supreme Court established an initial skeleton of how the MDA
preempted state tort actions.118 First, the Court established that
preemption would only apply where the FDA had completed a
detailed review a given device, specifically through the PMA
process generally used for new Class III devices.119 Practically

113. Sarah Collins, A Must-Read Overview of the Medical Device Industry, MKT. REALIST
(Nov. 19, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2015/11/must-read-overviewmedical-device-industry/.
114. See text accompanying notes 108–109.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
116. Much has been written on the meaning of preemption within the MDA, both for
explicit and implied preemption. This Article does not attempt to reopen this discussion
specifically, but rather to work within established case law to explain how AI might present
specific challenges related to the Court’s interpretation of the MDA preemption language.
117. State laws consist of statutory obligations specifically codified and common lawestablished duties.
118. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492 (1996).
119. Id. at 494.
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speaking, this meant that plaintiffs seeking recovery for device
injuries reviewed in abbreviated processes could survive express
preemption by the MDA.120 Abbreviated processes include the
510(k) process for substantially equivalent (SE) devices, other
abbreviated reviews, and lower-risk classification reviews (Class II
and Class I, which include the 510(k) process and exempted status,
respectively).121 This interpretation of the MDA reinforced the
balance between investment in comprehensive ex ante regulatory
approval and recovery for less comprehensive premarket
processes.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008) expanded PMA-informed
preemption to additional tort actions. Until Riegel, courts typically
found tort recovery preempted where a statute established
additional or different requirements from FDA requirements
promulgated as part of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In
Riegel, the Court expanded preemption application from positive
state law to include common law tort actions.122 The cumulative
effect of this interpretation is that where the FDA has established
overt requirements and reviewed compliance with these
requirements via the PMA process, all tort actions are preempted
except where the tort action parallels the FDA requirement, insofar
that they are not different or additional requirements.123
Riegel established that most common law claims stemming from
PMA-reviewed medical devices could not survive preemption.
First, the PMA approval process had to have established
requirements of “safety and effectiveness” under the MDA because
the FDA cannot approve devices that do not meet reasonable safety
and effectiveness standards.124 Second, because common law tort
actions in part determine “reasonable” duties with respect to
products, a jury could establish additional or different
requirements than the FDA has established.125 However, common
120. Id.
121. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2020); Suzanne Hodsden, FDA Releases List of Class I
Medical Devices Exempt from 510(k) Notifications, MED DEVICE ONLINE (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/fda-releases-list-of-class-i-medical-devicesexempt-from-k-notifications-0001.
122. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
123. In this way, Lohr introduced the possibility of parallel claims and Riegel
subsequently established recovery in these circumstances.
124. Jarret Sena, The Contours of the Parallel Claim Exception: The Supreme Court’s
Opportunity to Define the Ill-Defined, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 291, 304 (2014).
125. Id.
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law claims that parallel federal requirements could survive
preemption because they are not different or additional
requirements: they are the same requirements.126 Parallel claims, or
claims for recovery premised on violation of federal requirements,
may survive preemption under both Lohr and Riegel.127
Parallel claims may still be preempted under an implied
preemption model.128 Under implied preemption, preemption may
still apply even when language does not specifically determine
preemption, such as when such an activity does not occupy a “field
which the states have traditionally occupied.”129 In Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (2001), the Court found implied
preemption when a consultant for Buckman may have
misrepresented information to the FDA amounting to fraud.130 The
Court reasoned that the burden on manufacturers of exposure to
potential liability would become a disincentive for greater
competition and “delay the prescription of beneficial off-label
uses.”131 Lohr, Riegel, and Buckman collectively recognize an express
and implied preemption for devices approved via the PMA
process, with a narrow exception for parallel claims to federal
requirements.132
If only such federal requirements were sufficiently clear and
specific. As a threshold issue, it is unclear what is considered a
“genuinely equivalent” claim to a federal requirement.133
Moreover, it is unknown what even constitutes a “requirement.”
126. Id.
127. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494–95 (1996); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
128. Parallel claims may or may not be supported for recovery. Lohr and Riegel likely
created space for such a claim, but claims related to failure to warn or labeling may not
succeed under implied preemption. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th
Cir. 2017).
129. Sena, supra note 124, at 306 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
130. The Court held that activities like preventing fraud were principally within the
responsibilities of the FDA, rather than traditional state responsibilities. See Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001).
131. Sena, supra note 124, at 307.
132. See id. at 323–24 (examining Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769 (D. Minn.
2009)). Preemption follows from a two-step framework: (1) the government has established
requirements for the specific device at issue, and (2) whether the claims are based on
requirements different from or in addition to these federal requirements. See Shuker v.
Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 2018).
133. Sena, supra note 124, at 308–11 (quoting McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482,
489 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Seventh Circuit has held that genuine equivalence applies to the
medical device context. Id. at 310.
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The MDA references the requirement as “any requirement
applicable under [the MDA] to the device” or “which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included
in requirement applicable to the device under th[e] Act.”134 Where
there is not “sufficient information to establish a performance
standard . . . to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness, the Secretary may conduct such activities . . . to
develop or obtain such information.”135
If medical device preemption were not already imprecise, a
recent circuit court decision has complicated it further, specifically
for component devices subject to modulated review.136 In Shuker v.
Smith & Nephew, PLC (2018), the Third Circuit examined whether
components that were reviewed as separate classifications but
integrated into one device would survive preemption, which
requires courts to apply the “presumption against the pre-emption
[sic] of state police power regulations.”137 In Shuker, a component
was approved for a specific hip resurfacing system via the PMA
process set out in 510(k), but the plaintiff’s doctor used the
component off-label for a total hip replacement.138 The plaintiff
argued that claims related to the PMA component should not be
preempted because of the device’s component status within a
510(k)-reviewed system. However, according to the Third Circuit,
the use of the PMA component for off-label use essentially divorced
the component from the system, as the FDA identifies each
component as a separate device.139
Next, the Third Circuit applied the two-step test and found that
Riegel did not sufficiently explain how to examine mixed-class
components within a device.140 Under an argument of PMA
adherence, wherein any component of a 510(k)-approved device
inherits PMA status, the court ultimately held that each component,
134. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
135. Id. It should be noted that this section directly follows the section on classification,
which means that this interpretation of performance standards applies regardless of
classification.
136. At the time of writing, only the Third Circuit had considered this question, but the
expected reliance of device companies on third parties creating software, including AI, could
result in substantially more component-based preemption inquiries.
137. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 770–71 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518
(1992)).
138. Id. at 769.
139. Id. at 772–73.
140. Id. at 774.
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including the component of the device that caused Mr. Shuker’s
injury, was subject to PMA approval.141 Ultimately, claims related
to the PMA-reviewed component were preempted.142 Although
district courts have not completely deviated from the Third
Circuit’s analysis,143 the potential for “preemption by adherence,”
regardless of actual FDA review, is very troubling when
considering the potential for AI injuries. For example, courts have
yet to decide whether claims involving a PMA-approved system
with a 510(k) component are preempted. If the component is
responsible for injury, such as a defective AI software component,
but the system nevertheless was approved under a PMA, it is
unclear whether the component would inherit PMA status and tort
claims would be preempted or whether the component could be
analyzed independently.
AI software will likely be one component of physical medical
devices, potentially medical devices that are implanted or
otherwise could cause injury to the human body. However, the AI
software may be reviewed and approved as a separate component
from the physical medical device, and in some cases the AI may be
created by a third party, not a device manufacturer.144 While the
PMA process has, in most cases, almost fully preempted potential
recovery from PMA-cleared devices, the PMA process may extend
to injuries caused by components that nevertheless were not subject
to PMA review.
Except for cases involving injuries related to separately
classified component devices, Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel have
collectively established the following precedent for a tort claim to

141. Id. at 773–74.
142. Id. at 775.
143. See, e.g., LaFountain v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 14cv1598 (WWE), 2016 WL
3919796 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016). In LaFountain, multiple components of a hip replacement
system caused injury, and although some components were PMA-approved, the overall
system alleged to have injured LaFountain was not PMA-approved. The claims were alleged
to parallel federal requirements. In this case, the District of Connecticut court looked, as the
Third Circuit did, to the classification of the system, though the District also made explicit
the relationship between what caused the injury (e.g., the system, rather than a specific
component) to make this determination.
144. In the Author’s recent work with start-up medical device manufacturers, these
organizations have shared that they frequently use third-party AI software. Although not
dispositive, the practice is not rare.

1579

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

survive summary judgment when a PMA or similarly stringent
FDA review process is used145:
1. Does the tort claimant aim to recover on the basis of
different or additional state requirements (including general
tort duties determined by a jury) beyond federal or FDA
requirements?
2. For claims that allege a state-law requirement parallel to an
FDA-established requirement, is the requirement sufficiently
specific?
3. Is the state-law requirement mandatory or compulsory in
nature?
4. If a state-law claim is mandatory, sufficiently specific, and
parallel to federal requirement, is it still within the traditional
boundaries of what a state should regulate?

The cumulative effect of these cases is to almost completely
preempt tort actions when the FDA has used a PMA or similarly
stringent approval process for medical device clearance. Of course,
this preemption model will likely prevent recovery for AI-enabled
medical devices that are cleared through PMA or similarly
stringent approval processes, regardless of whether the FDA has in
fact reviewed the AI system running the medical device.
B. The Comprehensive Premarket Approval Process and Requirements
Are Not Designed for AI Devices
The FDA has used a variety of resources to provide direction to
manufacturers offering medical devices for sale in the United
States.146 Organizations are traditionally responsible for proposing
a specific classification for a new device.147 Organizations
proposing Class III devices (and other devices that cannot
145. It should be noted that these cases do firmly establish that when a noncomprehensive review process is used, such as the 510(k) process, tort actions may go
forward. Buckman was determined via implied preemption analysis but nevertheless
demonstrates the Court’s willingness to expand preemption beyond its express bounds. See
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001).
146. It should be noted that the definition of “medical device” is quite broad, including
potentially any health device, although the FDA may use its discretionary authority to not
review some medical devices, such as Class I health apps and other software. See U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., HOW TO DETERMINE IF YOUR PRODUCT IS A MEDICAL DEVICE (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/product-medicaldevice.
147. See 21 C.F.R. § 860 (2020).
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demonstrate Class I- or Class II-appropriate classification) must not
only successfully receive approval via the PMA process, but
manufacturing facilities must also meet quality management
standards.148 Manufacturers planning for the PMA process must
also meet pre-clinical trial requirements, including device design,
bench testing, and animal testing prior to a clinical trial.149
Clinical trial requirements for an IDE,150 the first step for PMA
approval, usually includes, inter alia, a two-trial approach to
determine feasibility followed by a clinical trial testing safety and
efficacy, or a pivotal study, for a patient population.151 Within the
PMA process, organizations must submit evidence of safety and
efficacy via scientific evidence, including a well-controlled clinical
investigation consisting of one or more trials, that includes a clear
statement of study objectives, a method for subject selection,
methods explanation, and articulation and comparison of results
using reliable statistical methods.152
The PMA application, which includes both clinical results and
labeling details, is reviewed by panels of FDA-employed experts,
who are assembled within a panel designation as part of the
Medical Devices Advisory Committee, which has eighteen
panels.153 These panels typically include experts in the principal
device’s primary scientific field; for example, the Circulatory
Systems Devices Panel consists of four cardiologists and one expert
in regulatory affairs.154

148. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 808, 812, 820 (2020). Manufacturing facilities must meet Current
Good Manufacturing Processes (CGMP) through an effective quality control system. It
should be noted that these inspections do not include virtual or technical infrastructure
reviews, wherein code might be reviewed; instead, CGMPs usually include sanitary and
repeatable quality facility operation checks.
149. Owen Faris, Clinical Trials for Medical Devices: FDA and the IDE Process, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/87603/download (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
150. See 21 C.F.R. § 812 (2019).
151. See Faris, supra note 149.
152. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA CLINICAL STUDIES (May 22, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-clinical-studies.
153. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 110; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MEDICAL DEVICES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2019) [hereinafter FDA, MED. DEVICES ADVISORY
COMM.], https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/medical-devices/medical-devicesadvisory-committee.
154. Roster of the Circulatory System Devices Panel, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/circulatory-system-devices-panel/rostercirculatory-system-devices-panel.
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Classification typically flows from predicate devices within a
panel’s statutory classification scheme. For example, portions of a
pacemaker will likely be classified under the Circulatory Systems
Devices Panel, with a similar classification to previously approved
devices. 155 A pacemaker programmer, a hand-held device that
non-invasively makes software changes to an implanted
pacemaker within a short physical distance from the
pacemaker, will typically be classified as a Class III medical
device and required to meet PMA requirements. 156 Each device
type typically must follow requirements communicated in the
CFR and specific requirements the FDA analyst and panel
identifies in reviewing the PMA file. The challenge, of course,
is that a panel of radiologists may not be experts in AI
software or even general software design, and requirements in
the CFR usually are not specific enough to guarantee software
quality. 157
However, classification and associated review can be
modulated, whereby certain portions of a device, such as the
software running a device, can be reviewed using different
classification standards that require less restrictive attendant
controls.158 For example, a physical pacemaker that is “new” for
purposes of review would likely be a Class III device requiring the
PMA process. However, if classified as separate modules, the
software running on the pacemaker would likely be a Class II
device not requiring the PMA process.159 When software is integral
to a medical device’s operation yet is reviewed in an isolated

155. 21 C.F.R. § 870 (2020).
156. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3700 (2020).
157. See infra Section II.C and accompanying notes.
158. Although Class II and Class III devices would both require special controls, a PMA
process review, through the FDA’s inquiry, would likely be more restrictive than the 510(k)
process in that the FDA and associated expert panels might ask questions to better
understand how manufactures have met special controls in this precise case.
159. Different component classifications could increase risks to patients when lower
classification components are implemented into a higher classification system. See Bill
Siwicki, Next-Gen Medical Devices: Security, AI, Rethinking Design for Patient Experience,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (June 19, 2018), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/next-genmedical-devices-security-ai-rethinking-design-patient-experience (describing the potential
for AI-driven device failure and the need for holistic device review). Logically, if a Class II
component inherits the preemptive power of the primary Class I device, injuries are both (1)
not prevented through comprehensive review and (2) preempted from tort recovery.
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manner, modulation in the review process likely prevents a holistic
safety review and preempts a comprehensive risk analysis.160
If the FDA was implementing a regulatory model that
anticipated patient risks associated with software and its
interaction with physical devices, such as AI-enabled device
systems, a modulated approach might not fully anticipate potential
risks. For example, an AI-enabled surgical robot might cause a
patient injury, not just because of the robot itself, but because of the
AI instructing the robot’s surgical moves. In this case, AI software
might have been reviewed in the 510(k) truncated process, while
the surgical robot and its basic local software was reviewed via the
PMA process. Therefore, the AI software may have received a less
stringent FDA review. However, because the robot received a PMA
review, and the AI software is part of the broader robotics system,
the entire system may be viewed from the preemption perspective
as having received a PMA review.161
Moreover, the PMA process is not, however, intended to be the
end of the process, at least for devices that are modified after PMA
clearance. A PMA supplement or PMA amendment must be
created when the device subject to the PMA process has
significantly changed from the material submitted in the PMA
submission. The PMA amendment is used when a change is needed
for a submitted, but not yet approved, PMA file.162 The PMA
supplement is used when the device has significantly changed or
the change affects the safety and efficacy of the device.163 Under
some circumstances, manufacturers may be required to resubmit a
PMA rather than as supplement, such as when changes to the
device might raise different types of safety or effectiveness

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 21 C.F.R. § 814.37 (2020).
163. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA SUPPLEMENTS AND AMENDMENTS (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-supplements-andamendments. These supplements may be specific to another indication for use, for significant
change to performance, changes in components or materials, changes in design, or changes
in labeling, amongst others. Some supplements are “real time,” or supplements for minor
changes. From a practical perspective, dynamically inscrutable AI software will not likely be
a good candidate for this kind of administrative process because it is constantly evolving.
Manufacturers would likely need to continuously fill out paperwork to stay current, leading
to administrative nightmares.
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questions or where there are no accepted test methods for
evaluating these new questions.164
The PMA process is somewhat comprehensive for what it
regulates, yet there are serious gaps, especially for AI-enabled
medical devices. These systems have the potential to create safety
hazards for patients but likely leave patients without any
opportunity for recovery in tort. Medical devices under PMA
review are often reviewed by experts, but not necessarily experts in
AI or software development; components of a medical device,
which are nevertheless incorporated into the final product, may not
receive a Class III classification or PMA review although they may
introduce new safety hazards.165 AI-enabled devices will usually
function differently than at their approval. But as a foundational
question, it is unclear which FDA instructions actually constitute a
“requirement” for purposes of the PMA process. The lack of clear
requirements and a reliance on non-binding “guidelines” or
“guidance” may create substantial downstream issues for tort
recovery.
C. The MDA Preemption Term “Requirement” Is Imprecise
Organizations must use FDA documents to guide the
development of products that will meet panel expectations, such as
requirements, regulations, and guidelines, or guidance.166
However, the term “requirement” is not as clear as might be
expected on its face. The FDA describes “regulatory requirements”
as including establishment registration, where manufacturing
facilities must be registered, medical device listing, premarket
notification or PMA processes, the IDE process for clinical trials,
quality system regulations, labeling requirements, and ongoing
issue reporting.167
Within the CFR sections specific to FDA processes, the term
“requirements” is used typically in relation to specific information
provided as part of the PMA process, such as details to be included
in clinical trial results, although some specific regulatory
164. Id.
165. See infra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
166. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PMA REVIEW PROCESS (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-review-process.
167. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF DEVICE REGULATION (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatoryassistance/overview-device-regulation; 21 C.F.R §§ 801, 803, 807, 812, 814, 820 (2020).
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requirements have been promulgated via the CFR.168 For example,
coronary vascular physiologic simulation (CVPS) software visually
simulates blood flow using data extracted from an coronary
imaging device.169 The results of such simulation software might
inform whether a patient requires medical treatment, such as
surgery or medication, to treat a coronary blood-flow issue that
increases a patient’s risk of a heart attack or stroke. This type of
software requires, according to the CFR, “verification and
validation based on comprehensive hazard analysis,” which
includes “any proprietary algorithm(s) used to model the vascular
anatomy.”170 The same provision of the CFR also requires
“adequate consideration of privacy and security issues in
[software’s] system design.”171
It is clear from the CFR “requirements,” the closest
approximation of which are special controls, that manufacturers
have discretion in how risks related to algorithm reliability and
other data integrity issues might be mitigated. In this example, a
manufacturer may rely on published yet nonbinding FDA
guidance to interpret how to meet CFR special controls, or they
may not. As guidance documents are non-binding, it is unclear
whether such documents could form the basis for a “requirement”
under the MDA even if they are integrated into PMA review by the
FDA analyst or panel.
D. Guidance Enhances Regulatory Requirement Breadth and Depth but
Does Not Address AI Concerns
Although regulatory requirements provide some direction in
terms of system design for a software product like CVPS software,
additional guidance is provided via other FDA documents.172 It is
168. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (2020). The term “requirements” is used throughout the
CFR in a variety of different contexts. Additional, device-specific regulatory requirements
are codified in 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 for medical devices.
169. 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415 (2020).
170. Id. The CFR continues, “Data must be provided within the clinical validation study
or using equivalent datasets demonstrating the consistency of the output that is
representative of the range of data quality likely to be encountered in the intended use
population and relevant use conditions in the intended use environment.” Id.
171. Id.
172. Although guidance documents are not legally binding, they often elucidate more
specificity for a regulatory requirement. For example, “adequate security and privacy” might
be appropriately implemented using premarket security guidance and used as the basis for
meeting this regulatory requirement in the PMA process.
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unclear whether and to what extent guidance documents are used
in the PMA approval process as binding requirements.173 The FDA,
for its part, has contextualized guidance as “not creat[ing] or
confer[ring] rights for or on any person . . .[,] not operat[ing] to bind
FDA or the public,” and offering the possibility for alternative
means to meet the underlying regulatory requirement.174
However, it is generally accepted that guidance operates, at
least for PMA reviews, as a pseudo-requirement. Specifically, FDA
personnel, for example the analyst assigned to the file, usually
evaluate compliance with a special control, such as “[a]dequate
consideration of privacy and security issues” through the lens of
guidance documents.175 In this way, guidance seems to operate, at
least for some types of reviews, as a rebuttable presumption: so
long as organizations demonstrably meet the guidance, they also
demonstrate compliance with associated special controls. If the
organization does not meet the guidance, they must provide
documentation to demonstrate that they still comply with the
special control. To what degree FDA personnel or panel members
actually provide expert direction in this review process is
unknown, though facially it seems unlikely that personnel and
panel members are equipped to review software design and
anticipate real patient risks for new software technology like AI
from a position of deep expertise.
For software-enabled medical devices, guidance documents
consist of software-specific documents and cybersecurity
documents, with the potential for future artificial intelligence
documents, amongst many planned software and cybersecurityrelated documents.176 Despite the plethora of different software
173. 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415.
174. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (MEDICAL DEVICES AND
RADIATION-EMITTING PRODUCTS) (2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/deviceadvice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/guidance-documents-medical-devices-andradiation-emitting-products.
175. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.1415(b)(1)(B)(ii).
176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES (2016) [hereinafter FDA,
POSTMARKET], https://www.fda.gov/media/95862/download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL EVALUATION (2017), [hereinafter FDA,
SAMD] https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL
DEVICES (2018) [hereinafter FDA, PREMARKET], https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/search-fda-guidance-documents/content-premarket-submissions-
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guidance documents, software bugs and security vulnerabilities
continue to plague medical devices.177
The FDA has not developed many guidance documents related
to AI or algorithms specifically, though it has developed general
guidance for software.178 It is unknown, however, to what degree
guidance actually informs specific PMA decisions, and the extent
of software or similar review, when panel members may be experts
in the physical device, but not the software or other computerized
technology that run it.179 Of course, modulated reviews may not
provide any direct PMA review for portions of a full device,
although the device, as operating, may pose patient risks.
Given these challenges in control review, personnel and panel
expertise, and modulated reviews, it is no surprise that the FDA has
taken a predominantly responsive rather than proactive approach
for new technologies, first relying on postmarket guidance rather
than PMA review.180 When this approach has become more
management-cybersecurity-medical-devices. AI has not received the direct attention of
software and cybersecurity, although the recent whitepaper is illustrating an interest in the
subject. Additional interest has revived for software validation, prompting a 2019 goal for
new final guidance on Changes to Existing Medical Software Policies Resulting from Section 3060
of the 21st Century Cures Act and Clinical and Patient Decision Support Software. See U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., CDRH FISCAL YEAR 2019 PROPOSED GUIDANCE DEVELOPMENT AND
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW (2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/cdrh-fy2019-proposed-guidance-development-and-retrospective-review. Planned draft guidance
includes Computer Systems Assurance for Manufacturing, Operations, and Quality System
Software; Content of Premarket Submissions for Cybersecurity of Medical Devices of Moderate and
Major Level of Concern; and Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software
Contained in Medical Devices. Id.
177. See Jay G. Ronquillo & Diana M. Zuckerman, Software-Related Recalls of Health
Information Technology and Other Medical Devices: Implications for FDA Regulation of Digital
Health, 95 MILBANK Q. 535 (2017). The existence of a continuing issue in software-related
recalls demonstrates the imprecise nature of upfront review and approval, even through a
rigorous PMA process.
178. See Price, supra note 24, at 443; see, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFF-THE-SHELF
SOFTWARE USE IN MEDICAL DEVICES (1999), https://www.fda.gov/media/71794/
download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE VALIDATION
(2002), https://www.fda.gov/media/73141/download; FDA, SAMD, supra note 176; U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR
SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MEDICAL DEVICES (2005), https://www.fda.gov/media/73065/
download.
179. See FDA, MED. DEVICES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 153; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 154.
180. See, e.g., FDA, PREMARKET, supra note 176; FDA, POSTMARKET, supra note 176. The
FDA issued postmarket guidance prior to drafting premarket requirements. There is reason
to believe that the FDA is following as similar path with AI machines to promote innovation

1587

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

proactive, it often is managed separately, in a non-PMA-integrative
manner.181
This responsive, rather than proactive, approach has raised
some concerns. For example, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
has urged the FDA to integrate cybersecurity risk reviews into the
premarket review process for medical devices.182 The OIG has
identified the need for “Refuse-to-Accept” checklists, the FDA’s
Smart template, and a dedicated cybersecurity review section, none
of which the FDA has previously implemented.183 AI software,
although making news headlines for years, has not been examined
other than development of a single discussion paper in 2019.184
Collectively, this seems to suggest that although the FDA is
aware of new technology risks, the review process is not currently
designed to identify and prevent cyber-kinetic safety hazards and
poorly designed AI software.185 And, in a preemption world,
injured patients are unlikely to recover despite an insufficient or
non-existent review. When the MDA was passed in 1976, the
regulatory structure, including preemption language, was
designed to rely on deep expertise from the FDA. Today, even the
comprehensive and rigorous PMA process does not effectively
anticipate AI machine issues, including components and device
review modulation or the integration of AI software into analog
via responsive rather than preventative measures. See Bibb Allen, The Role of the FDA in
Ensuring the Safety and Efficacy of Artificial Intelligence Software and Devices, 16 J. AM. COLL.
RADIOLOGY 208 (2018). Despite the value of postmarket surveillance, it cannot solve AI safety
issues on its own. See Price, supra note 24, at 462–64 (describing the value of postmarket
surveillance activities both for continuous improvement and to support the inherent
dynamism of changing, self-learning AI technologies). Nicholson Price cautions against
relying on postmarket surveillance as a silver bullet for safety concerns. Id.
181. SUZANNE MURRIN, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., FDA
SHOULD FURTHER INTEGRATE ITS REVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY INTO THE PREMARKET REVIEW
PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES (2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-1600220.pdf.
182. See generally id.
183. Id. at 12. Pre- and postmarket guidance began in 2014 for cybersecurity risks, and
although FDA personnel usually requested cybersecurity documentation for medical
devices, the FDA “almost always cleared or approved the cybersecurity aspect of networked
medical devices.” Id. at 11. Although cybersecurity risks are not necessarily the same as
artificial intelligence risks, they illustrate a useful model of what can be improved with new
technology risks.
184. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84.
185. For example, a cyber attacker that alters an AI utility that provides direction to a
connected pacemaker may cause physical heart damage via digital means. Poor AI design
could, as the algorithm changes, create many of the same physical safety issues when the
algorithm drives physical function of an associated device.
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medical devices. Based on its current structure and processes, it is
unknown whether the FDA will direct its resources to
comprehensively regulate AI software and whether patients be left
with no remedy for their injuries.
III. THE REGULATORY-TORT RISK CALCULUS
Effective product safety regimes, including medical device
products, balance both regulatory systems and tort recovery as part
of a complementary model. In determining this balance, it is crucial
to examine circumstances from the perspective of the
administrative agency’s ability to regulate and associated costs, the
consumer’s ability to avoid injury, and the inherent nature of the
technology itself, which could promote latent issues due to its
changeability or opacity. An appropriate regulatory-tort allocation
likely includes elements of both to promote information dispersion
for safety purposes and promote compensation for injured parties.
A. Risk Management Legal Systems Allocate Risks Between Regulatory
Activity and the Tort System as Complementary, Rather than
Competing, Solutions
Consumer protection has historically included ex ante and ex
post solutions as part of a holistic legal framework. Ex ante legal
solutions usually take the form of regulation and administrative
clearance and approvals, preventative measures intended to reduce
consumer injury. For example, manufacturers of general use
products have a duty to warn consumers of any reasonably likely
injury and communicate appropriate instructions for product use.
FDA-reviewed products have, for some time, illustrated a kind
of gold standard for preemption. The FDA is one of the best-funded
agencies in the United States combined with both a congressionally
defined obligation to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical
products. The FDA, for its part, has changed its position regarding
preemption from case to case.186 Under certain administrations,
funding for the FDA and executive orders have influenced the
186. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents/Cross-Petitioners, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (No. 95-754),
1996 WL 118035, at *13 (stating the FDA’s view that state tort claims generally are not
preempted), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 3231418, at *20 (stating the
FDA’s view that state tort claims are preempted insofar as they assert that a device in its FDAapproved form is not safe or effective for use as directed in the FDA-approved labeling).
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FDA’s priorities and degree of review.187 Dynamic shifts in
regulatory direction demonstrate the limits of regulatory solutions
to enhance consumer confidence and ensure consumer safety.
Selecting federal agency regulation and preemption as the
preferred solution for regulating health and safety requires a belief
in the “rationality of the regulatory agency’s agenda and the
agency’s assessment and allocation of risks.”188 The challenge, of
course, is that agencies are often at the direction of the executive
branch and subject to executive orders, creating a variable
regulatory model, and their ability to prioritize activities is based
on the availability of funding approved by Congress and the
current state of the marketplace.189 Agency behavior, therefore, is
not static.
Legal scholars and economists have debated the merits of
regulatory and tort approaches to regulating behavior. For
example, economists have often argued that agencies provide
better oversight than courts due to “specialized knowledge,”
especially around technical subject matter.190 Specialized
knowledge is implemented via cost-benefit analysis, which
presumably includes risk assessment of a specific scenario or
system-level assessment, wherein some scenarios receive more
attention than others. It is system-level assessment that created the
class structure for the FDA and a specialized knowledge
expectation that likely motivated express preemption language
under the MDA.191 Also, this expectation of specialized knowledge

187. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K)
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 207 (2011), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13150/
medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-the-fda-510k-clearance.
188. Id. at 153.
189. Richard Epstein has argued that preemption of tort claims will not necessarily
hamper information sharing or prevent risk information from being available. See generally
Catherine M. Sharkey, Field Preemption: Opening the “Gates of Escape” from Tort Law, J. LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming 20XX), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3159537.
Epstein seems to suggest that individuals, with appropriate information, can self-select from
a variety of options available to them. See id. (manuscript at 5–6). Unfortunately, most
medical devices have few competing options. Further, the dynamic inscrutability of key
aspects of AI machines makes explainability and “information” difficult if not impossible to
produce for purposes of making an informed decision.
190. Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 138, 139 (1995) (citing
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory State, in Tort Law and the Public Interest
(Peter Schuck ed., 1991)).
191. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); Sena, supra note 124.
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likely influenced the Court’s recognition of implied preemption in
Buckman.
Catherine Struve has addressed the FDA regulatory-tort
allocation question, noting that relying too heavily on preemption
rejects the value of tort for complementing safety goals, and it
simultaneously denies patients compensation.192 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority in Lohr, seemed to echo this concept,
reasoning that a damages remedy in state court does not amount to
a different or additional requirement for purposes of preemption.193
After Riegel, however, Catherine Sharkey has questioned whether
the Court’s view has rejected the concept of tort as a
complementary compensatory model in favor of a competitive
view of state and federal law.194
Further, tort systems signal opportunities for greater regulation
and oversight. Although regulatory agencies may carry the longterm burden of regulation to prevent known injuries, the tort
system offers an opportunity to understand new injuries from
causes yet to be understood, often while drawing upon historical
principles.195 In many cases, the tort system and regulatory agencies
may perform a reinforcing function for each other.196 The question,
however, is one of balance: how might a regulatory-tort system
allocate risk appropriately for given scenarios?
Due to resource constraints and device variability, the FDA
cannot comprehensively regulate an industry, and the tort system
may uncover important safety hazards that escape review.197 The
FDA has implemented a model that includes both preventative
192. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarking Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 591 (2005).
For allocation systems without strong preemption, the tort system is seen as complementary
to agencies for creating safety standards or signaling proposed changes.
193. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996).
194. Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law
Products Liability Claims (Part II), 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415, 417 (2008). Typically
Congress creates a complementary model by including not only an express preemption
clause but also a savings clause that preserves common law liability. Id. at 416. The Court in
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009), though examining preemption related to the drug
rather than device industry, has echoed the value of complementary models. See Efthimios
Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 932, 933 n.18 (noting tort remedies “‘reinforce[] a norm of
attentiveness to safety’ and ‘serve[] as a counterweight to regulatory capture.’”) (citation
omitted).
195. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 169.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 141.
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activities as clearance, continuing organizational monitoring
obligations, and responsive actions in the case of safety or efficacy
problems, such as recalls, replacements, and updates. However,
when the administration desires to stimulate innovation, the FDA
often reduces its preventative oversight activities, relying more
heavily on manufacturers, hospitals, and device users to report
issues.198
The ex post tort system, then, provides additional controls to
regulatory requirements a given organization must follow.199
Amongst a substantial history of scholars focusing on FDA
preemption, Struve proposes alternative options to a traditional
tort system wherein the FDA might be part of technical review in
federal court or the court might adjudicate safety reviews referred
to an FDA panel.200 These proposals identify some value in the tort
system, whether the system focuses on tort law’s signaling function
regarding safety or considers compensation of the injured party
who might otherwise be left without remedy.
Although courts are often criticized for a lack of expertise in
technical subject matters, adjudication does have its benefits. For
one, courts have access to any number of experts and documents,
which can explore a specific technology in depth.201 Second, courts
have the benefit of the adversarial system, wherein additional
information can be explored or exposed by the plaintiff and
defendant as part of the legal process. Finally, the court operates in
a social context, applying social principles to resolve conflicts rather
than specifically operating according to an established agenda.202
Sometimes, even the regulatory system cannot perform its role
as keeper of specialized knowledge. In Struve’s example, as in
many other proposals for preemption prior to Lohr, the FDA is
positioned as an information broker and risk manager. For
traditional and well-known technologies, it is less likely for
common issues to be missed; for new technologies, the FDA may
198. Susan Kelly, FDA Details Ramp-Up of Postmarket Device Oversight, MEDTECH DIVE,
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.medtechdive.com/news/fda-details-ramp-up-ofpostmarket-device-oversight/542787/.
199. Id.
200. Struve, supra note 192, at 592, 591 n.14.
201. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 157. Certainly, the FDA has an information-generating
function and has the ability to collect a great deal of data. The challenge, however, is that the
FDA’s information-generating function is limited by resource constraints, specifically
funding and qualified personnel.
202. Id. at 163.
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be required to invest much more time and effort to understand the
risk profile affecting device safety and efficacy. For these new
technologies, agencies typically rely on known technologies to
assess risk, which may not be accurate.203 In short, the more cutting
edge the device, the more time the FDA will expend. And the time
spent reviewing these devices will be based on available
information from the manufacturer.
However, based on the FDA’s reluctance to regulate AI as part
of traditional device review and its lack of informative reference
documents, the FDA is not an expert agency for AI.204 It can also be
argued that although the FDA has created a number of softwarerelated documentation, it is ineffective in its review of softwarerelated risks.205 When an agency like the FDA does not completely
review a technology or component of a technology, it is unclear
whether the FDA has engaged in a system-level cost-benefit
calculation meriting complete preemption, or whether the FDA has
only conducted risk analysis with respect to the aspects it has
actually reviewed.206 For example, if the FDA is conducting a PMA
review for the bionic pancreas and fails to effectively prevent AIrelated injuries, it is unknown whether the FDA has opted not to
review AI based on system-level risk, has not reviewed the AI
component because the component introduces comparatively less
risk than other technical aspects of the pancreas, or simply has not
reviewed the AI component because it lacks the expertise.
203. Id. at 154.
204. In fact, the agency best positioned to regulate AI technologies or promote
standardization is the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), which is not
explicitly integrated into the medical device review process and does not currently perform
any regulatory approval role. See 15 U.S.C. § 271.
205. See supra text accompanying note 177. I should mention that for some types of
technologies, for example software and AI software, it is tremendously difficult, if not
impossible, to identify potential issues at the time of PMA submission based on partial
software functionality, especially software that may require updates or self-update after the
time of approval.
206. In system-level cost-benefit analysis, AI may not present enough risk to be
reviewed at all, but other high-risk aspects of the medical device might be fully reviewed.
For example, an artificial pancreas that relies on AI may be reviewed as an implantable
device under a PMA, while the AI infrastructure only qualifies as a Class II device requiring
a 510(k). Differing technology system components reviewed separately demonstrate that the
FDA is not taking a holistic risk approach. When AI systems are part of the system but are
modulated, their impact on the full medical device system is not analyzed. Decisions are
often made under conditions of uncertainty, and both regulation and responsive legal
process provide additional information through ex ante and ex post processes. Lyndon, supra
note 190, at 143.
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Innovative technologies like AI are challenging to regulate
because they are not often created by sophisticated medical device
manufacturers. More frequently, innovative technologies are
produced by third parties, including start-ups, that have a niche
knowledge base and little capital, for purposes of selling the
technology or the company to larger manufacturers.207 Practically
speaking, this means that start-ups most frequently will spend their
capital on development and proofs of concept, rather than
compliance measures.208 The goal is to create something that works,
rather than to expend capital on proving safety for a large
population.
By the time the FDA reviews these devices, the FDA may not
have the expertise or time to complete a thorough review, and the
acquiring manufacturer may not have the requisite knowledge or
expertise to anticipate potential safety issues without prompting by
an expert regulator. The issue, then, is one of knowledge
dispersion.209 And agencies like the FDA do not have a monopoly
on knowledge about innovation.210 Most specialized knowledge
resides in the developers and experts themselves, especially for
innovative technologies.211
B. The Tort System Provides a Mechanism for Information Dispersion
and Plaintiff Compensation
The tort system, by design, functions to verify appropriate
duties and measure whether a defendant has met its duty with
respect to a plaintiff(s). Most frequently, and especially after Lohr,
plaintiffs bring common law negligence tort lawsuits for products
causing injury. Common law negligence actions require four
elements: (1) the manufacturer has a duty, established as a
common-law “reasonable” duty; (2) the manufacturer breaches
that duty; (3) the breach of duty is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff has a compensable injury
meeting Article III standing requirements.212
207. See MEDPAC, supra note 8, at 210.
208. See id.
209. Lyndon, supra note 190, at 149–51.
210. Id. at 157.
211. Id. at 157–58.
212. It should be noted that some commentators on AI have suggested a strict liability
approach to AI regulation. See generally Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the
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The calculus for these systems considers the burden on
organizations to meet upfront requirements, the burden of
individual consumers to protect their own interests (caveat emptor),
and potential impacts when consumers may recover in tort or other
litigation. These systems consider a number of factors with respect
to offering consumer products for sale: (1) the expense associated
with implementing quality control or other upfront processes
(preventative expense), (2) the cost of funding government
oversight for these processes and overall ability of a government
agency to effectively oversee these processes (regulator efficiency),
(3) the ability of a consumer to select products with appropriate
safety knowledge (consumer self-protection), (4) the potential for
consumer injury (injury risk), (5) the market-chilling potential of
large lawsuits to slow innovation (innovation interest), and (6) the
direct costs of large class actions impacting business performance
and subsequent investment (market interest).213 These factors are
highly dependent on the industry and sub-groups within an
industry, and the distribution of burdens between business,
government agencies, and consumers depends on the industry,
history of abuse or injury, and political leanings of federal and state
legislators.
Preemption language that limits state powers is a key hallmark
of ex ante regulation when a federal regulator is positioned to
effectively promote social utility due to their relative expertise.
Preemption is an extension of the Supremacy Clause wherein
federal law, by statutory language, meaning, or intent, ensures state
laws do not apply under certain circumstances. Preemption is

Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (proposing that where AI is safer
than a reasonable person, strict liability should be replaced by a negligence standard);
Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1315, 1331–33 (2020)
(describing the lack of foreseeability for AI injuries needed for traditional concepts of strict
liability). As Rebecca Crootof notes, in products liability cases, strict liability is typically
reserved for manufacturing defects, rather than labeling or design decisions causing injury.
See Rebecca Crootof, An Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address
Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583 (2019).
213. Cost discussions for high-risk devices usually are motivated via a law and
economics approach to the regulatory-tort allocation, and typically a law and economics
approach will reinforce preemption where an administrative agency, like the FDA, carries
specific expertise and the risk-benefit calculus swings towards safety rather than availability.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 B.C. L. REV. 203, 207 (2012)
(describing the calculus for products liability lawsuits, wherein regulatory compliance
solutions present a net benefit “only if the social benefit from reducing risk exceeds the loss
in utility”).
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either direct, or explicit, in nature when Congress specifically
includes preemption language, or it is implied when a federal court
determines that Congress intended for preemption to apply either
because the federal and state laws are in conflict (conflict
preemption) or when the agency is intended to completely occupy
a specific field (field preemption).214 The effect of both express and
implied preemption, as applied by the courts, is that state law
claims cannot be effectively brought, and usually preempted claims
are dismissed before summary judgment.
Although preemption may appear to be limiting to plaintiffs
(and it is), the expected allocation usually involves greater focus on
ex ante obligations, as would be the case with FDA requirements in
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), the MDA, and associated
CFR special controls. When organizations are required to invest in
preventative consumer or population safety, federal legislators
have embraced preemption to ensure organizations are not paying
twice: both for preventative measures and potentially in tort.
Preemption has often been used as a model for establishing both
baseline and maximum obligations for a given organization, an
important tool to improve outcomes for consumers, such as
medical device patients, while increasing the consistency of global
organizational behavior. Preemption is not always a negative,
unless the agency providing direction cannot reasonably prevent
consumer injury.
C. The FDA’s Risk Calculus for AI Software-Enabled Machines Does
Not Effectively Prevent Patient Injury
Following Lohr and Riegel, the Court has been clear about where
tort recovery is possible: when medical devices have not undergone
a PMA process and, if they have been approved via PMA, when
claims are drawn specifically to FDA requirements, or parallel
claims.215 Several scholars have criticized this line of reasoning,
arguing that Congress’ intent with the MDA was not to establish a
214. While express preemption is specifically included by Congress in a given law,
implied preemption is most typically constructed as field preemption, or where Congress
has positioned an agency primarily responsible for a specific area of commerce or activity
and when such an agency has specialized knowledge or when the state has engaged in
activities typically reserved for a federal agency (as in Buckman). Sena, supra note 124, at 350
(resolving that express preemption and implied preemption in Buckman would result in little
remaining for tort recovery).
215. See supra text accompanying note 122–123.
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near-bar on tort recovery both at statute and within the common
law.216 Further, after Buckman, it appears that other claims, such as
failure to warn or labeling claims, may still be barred on the basis
of implied preemption if the court can find that the type of claim is
not something the state would have typically regulated, or “statelaw claims that seek to privately enforce duties owed to the
FDA.”217 Commentators have surmised that recovery for injuries
caused by PMA-cleared medical device use is nearly foreclosed due
to the exceptionally “narrow gap” occupied by the parallel claim
exception to preemption.218
The risk allocation presented at the system level may not seem
problematic. Devices undergoing more truncated review, such as
Class II medical devices and Class III medical devices that are
deemed substantially equivalent to a predicate device, will
undergo the abbreviated 510(k) process, and tort actions will not be
preempted. Claims resulting from Class I medical device injuries,
devices subject to general controls and usually not reviewed by the
FDA at all, will also not be preempted. This means that claims for
injuries resulting from 95% of devices marketed for sale will not be
preempted.219
However, when patients are injured by the highest-risk devices,
which may use AI, their claims will most likely be preempted
because presumably the FDA has comprehensively reviewed
device design and attendant risks. This model may work effectively
to minimize injury when the FDA is able to effectively review and
prevent large-scale risks of a certain type, but it will likely leave
patients using AI-enabled devices who have suffered injury
uncompensated.
The risk calculus adopted through Congress’ preemption
language and the Court’s implied preemption analysis
demonstrates a view of the FDA that is largely inaccurate with
216. I do not seek to retread this discussion but rather to introduce new challenges
within the existing framework, which may frustrate the delicate tradeoffs established
through the MDA and court decisions.
217. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (describing the
holding of Buckman).
218. In re Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Riley v. Cordis
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009)).
219. Michael Drues, Are You Sure You Know the Best Regulatory Pathway for Your New
Medical Device? MED DEVICE ONLINE (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/
doc/are-you-sure-you-know-the-best-regulatory-pathway-for-your-new-medical-device0001.
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respect to AI machines. The FDA, at this time and likely in the
future, is ill-prepared to effectively provide the specialized
knowledge that will inform effective ex ante regulation
contemplated by the MDA. It is crucial to reiterate that, based on
the specificity of special controls, the lack of detailed guidance, and
the existence of a singular discussion paper on AI, the FDA is
clearly not positioned to guide manufacturers to produce safe AI
machines. Further, the structure of the review process, including
the expertise of FDA analysts and panel members, limits the
potential for holistic device reviews that effectively anticipate
potential patient risks.
These realities, however, do not alone permit tort actions to
move forward. In the preemption trilogy, the Court has not yet
identified a lack of expertise on specific subject matter or
modulated review as justification for avoiding preemption. The
injuries in these cases have, from the Court’s perspective, been
contemplated by Congress as a natural result of the FDA’s costbenefit analyses, regardless of whether those analyses were
conducted from a position of actual expertise or not.
IV. SOLVING THE ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT MEDICAL DEVICE
PREEMPTION PROBLEM
Although scholars, including this Author, have consistently
urged better and more comprehensive and effective regulatory
activity for AI, the FDA has not responded with useful solutions.
AI technologies, due to their dynamic inscrutability, inherently are
a poor fit for a regulatory clearance model largely dependent on
point-in-time information disclosure that reasonably reflects how a
device will operate after clinical trials. However, much of what the
FDA does is effective for purposes of minimizing broad-scale
injuries, especially for technologies where the FDA and its panel
members have developed considerable expertise.
In the current regulatory environment, tort actions may be
desirable both as an opportunity to indirectly affect safety decisions
and to afford plaintiffs compensation. If the FDA is not effectively
regulating software, especially AI, for safety and efficacy, as is their
Congressional mandate, surely any conception of an effective riskbenefit allocation, especially one turning on regulator expertise,
will leave plaintiffs without remedy for their injuries. And although
it seems unlikely for most tort claims to withstand summary
judgment, for AI machines, opportunities may not be completely
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foreclosed. Plaintiffs harmed by AI machines may successfully
avoid preemption with arguments related to structure, regulation,
or technology.
A. FDA Improvement Proposals Cannot Fully Manage AI Safety Risks
Scholars have argued for a number of improvements in the
clearance process, and this Author does not aim to retread these
valuable efforts here. In particular, scholars have argued for a more
effective and complete review process, including specific
governance by a separate regulatory agency for algorithms,220 the
movement of more explicit requirements and guidance to special
controls,221 a system-based regulatory model including producers
and users to improve quality,222 disclosure of details around AI
design to other parties in the health system and ongoing review,223
the competition of private entities with the opportunity for
consumer selection,224 and the opportunity for certification by
experts.225
In its present state, and likely due to the FDA’s lack of resources
to build out a complete program for AI software–enabled devices,
external certification appears to be the most likely of ex ante
solutions that could protect patients to a greater extent. Scholars at
the Mercatus Center of George Mason University have advocated
for competing certification entities that can directly communicate
to consumers through labeling and branding solutions, consumers

220. See Tutt, supra note 62, at 107 (proposing a classification and standardization
approach for algorithms to be reviewed according to their complexity). Following Ford and
Price, Tutt also sees value in third-party organization certification or some public disclosure
for purposes of inspection. Id. at 110; see also Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II,
Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016).
221. See Tschider, supra note 64, at 209 (proposing collaborative efforts to develop
documents with NIST).
222. See Price, supra note 24, at 467–70 (highlighting the role of providers, hospital
systems, and insurers in enhancing algorithmic quality and use).
223. Id. Price proposes that other players in the systems, in addition to the FDA,
monitor ongoing algorithmic performance to prevent safety issues. This proposal offers a
unique addition to upfront and ongoing regulation where a collaborative systems approach
might improve overall safety. This Author proposes that perhaps another portion of this
collaborative effort involves the courts, as needed, to address compensatory concerns.
224. Richard Williams, Robert Graboyes & Adam Thierer, US Medical Devices: Choices
and
Consequences,
MERCATUS
CTR.
AT
GEO.
MASON
U.
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Williams-Medical-Devices.pdf.
225. Ford & Price, supra note 220, at 19.
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who presumably will be able to better select “safe” devices.226 In a
more practical solution, especially for AI-enabled devices, Roger
Allen Ford and Nicholson Price have, in relation to medical AI,
argued for expert certification wherein trade secrets present in AI
algorithms or processes will be preserved, though the algorithms
themselves may be verified by third-party experts.227
Unsurprisingly, and in an effort to control costs and promote
innovation, the FDA has also been interested in self-regulation
models to address these issues.228 These models include a policy for
self-regulated “low-risk” wellness devices, where the FDA takes a
hands-off approach to regulation,229 and the Pre-Cert for digital
health software, where organizations pre-certify, as described in
the TPRC discussion paper, as well.230 The proposed software to be
regulated under Pre-Cert has a quantum of quality issues, hardly
the medical devices requiring less FDA involvement.231 Further, the
Trump Administration’s direction towards truncated and
expedited reviews as an opportunity for innovation opened
additional approval doors in addition to the traditional PMA and
510(k) reviews. However, if the FDA cannot advance patient safety
with full PMA reviews for certain types of technology risks, it is
unlikely that the FDA will advance patient safety for truncated
reviews. Essentially, third-party reviews will enhance upfront
processes and are an excellent supporting process for FDA
clearance. However, for adaptive software, such as AI, many issues
simply cannot be anticipated at the time of clearance.

226. See Williams et al., supra note 224.
227. This proposal offers much for upfront regulatory approaches where the FDA
cannot provide the appropriate expertise for algorithmic validation and does solve the AI
expertise issue with respect to the algorithm itself. It does not, holistically, involve a complete
device system analysis, which might reveal new or different risks to patients.
228. See, e.g., Medical Device De Novo Classification Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 63127
(proposed Dec. 7, 2018) (proposing an alternative pathway truncated pathway to the PMA
for new devices that are not substantially equivalent under a 510(k) process); U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION (PRE-CERT) PROGRAM (2020)
[hereinafter FDA, PRE-CERT], https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/
digital-health-software-precertification-pre-cert-program (offering an alternative pathway
for digital health software wherein the organization rather than the device is certified to
maintain certain standards, speeding release of software on an ongoing basis).
229. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW-RISK DEVICES
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/90652/download.
230. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84; FDA, PRE-CERT, supra note 228.
231. See Price, supra note 24, at 455–57 (examining Nathan Cortez’s work on mHealth
apps and offering examples of health software device failure).
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As medical devices increasingly become AI-enabled, the FDA
appears to be even less, rather than more, involved in preventing
safety hazards. In part due to expertise issues, approaches like a
pre-certification process put more onus on organizations to
internally adhere to certified processes, similar to Quality
Management System processes in manufacturing facilities.
However, software design, especially AI system design, is not
manufacturing.
While manufacturing relies on repeatability to a specific
standard deviation, software design, especially AI engineering, is
“fit for purpose” and personalized. A given organization, even
with good processes and responsible developers and data
scientists, could produce good or bad AI, because one AI utility
could work well for one type of device or population and poorly
for another.232 AI is designed to fulfill specific goals for a specific
device and the people who use it. Nicholson Price has examined the
impact of low- and high-context environments, or environments
with a low or high degrees of specialization and resources,
respectively, as one factor in how effective AI might be.233 It has also
been noted that AI that are not tuned to serve certain communities
may end up producing discriminatory (and in health, unsafe or less
effective), results.234 If the same algorithm can be more or less
effective under specific circumstances or with specific populations,
it is unreasonable to believe that AI safety could be managed
through manufacturer pre-certification processes.
The FDA has moved away from both preventative solutions to
increasingly truncated and self-managed solutions. And if these
processes are dovetailed or serve as surrogates for the PMA
process, manufacturers will enjoy an almost comprehensive
defense for any claims brought against these devices while
simultaneously benefitting from a less stringent FDA review and
associated investment. The net effect, then, is that manufacturers
benefit twice, while consumers, often patients with serious health
conditions, lose. It cannot be ignored that tort preemption of AI
machines under these circumstances could result in injury,

232. Third-party software usage in this context presents significantly more risk for this
reason.
233. See Price, supra note 68.
234. Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505 (2019).
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including death, of human beings without any opportunity for
compensation.
B. Tort Solutions May Promote Information Sharing and Compensate
Victims for Largely Unknown Technologies235
In situations where technology is largely unknown and
substantial risks still exist after ex ante regulatory solution, the law
has turned to torts as an effective ex post opportunity for injury
compensation. For this reason, when innovative technology offers
substantial public benefit but agencies lack the ability to
comprehensively regulate either due to expertise or inherent
technology dynamics, courts should find opportunities to avoid
preemption and appropriately compensate victims when injuries
result.236
1. Preventative expense
When examining potential factors that inform how courts may
consider the role of preemption within the regulatory-tort
framework, AI software-enabled medical devices demonstrate a
need for both ex ante and ex post solutions. From the perspective
of preventative expense, implementing a comprehensive and
preventative regulatory quality control for software likely will not,
if completely reliant on regulatory review, make sense for most AIenabled medical devices. Although the FDA has an opportunity to
improve upfront regulatory processes by improving requirements,
bolstering review panels and analyst expertise, and setting
standards for AI creation, and, potentially, by independent thirdparty review, there are certain realities about AI that are not cured
by these types of processes. For example, unlocked AI is
235. It is completely unknown and truly anyone’s guess what the potential cost of
lawsuits in the AI device space might be, but the cost of device lawsuits is well-known and
very high. This Author makes the contention, however, that the other factors related to tort
recovery might outweigh potential costs if this is the only factor cutting towards regulatory
primacy.
236. This result is consistent with regulatory trade-offs as well as FDA communication
on the topic. The FDA is seeking to promote innovation and reduce time to market for
purposes of improving human life. See Scott Gottlieb, FDA’s Comprehensive Effort to Advance
New Innovations: Initiatives to Modernize for Innovation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 29,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-andexperts/fdas-comprehensive-effort-advance-new-innovations-initiatives-modernizeinnovation. When the regulatory process is truncated or efficacy is reduced, it makes sense
that the court system will take the slack if injuries result.
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dynamic.237 This dynamism means that any point in time, review,
especially before it has been used by a large population, cannot
accurately predict what potential safety hazards might be, at least
those originating from the algorithm.
Further, the inscrutability aspect of more advanced AI
complicates ongoing and preventative monitoring, or even
postmarket surveillance, a crucial part of the FDA regulatory
structure that enables the FDA to take action, such as recalling
devices to prevent further injury.238 In terms of regulatory
efficiency, heavy upfront clearance processes and postmarket
surveillance processes will likely reduce, but not reasonably
prevent, downstream patient injuries, as in a typical medical device
environment manufacturers are disincentivized to timely
communicate safety information.239 Practically speaking, the FDA
will likely incur a substantial burden if it is completely responsible
for reviewing all algorithms, even if these algorithms are not
completely inscrutable.240
2. Regulator efficiency
Next, although the FDA receives considerable government
funding, the current structure for FDA review cannot, as it stands,
appropriately anticipate AI issues in an efficient manner. At its
core, FDA review is incompatible with the realities of AI because it
is a linear process, designed for product development lifecycles.
Although FDA review’s effectiveness as a risk prioritization
mechanism can be debated, and injuries, some catastrophic, still
occur, it is indisputably true that the MDA’s general structure has
237. See Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. on Steps Toward a
New, Tailored Review Framework for Artificial Intelligence-Based Medical Devices, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-steps-toward-newtailored-review-framework-artificial; Grigg, supra note 38.
238. All devices that undergo a 510(k) or PMA process must engage in postmarket
monitoring activities. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET REQUIREMENTS (DEVICES)
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatoryassistance/postmarket-requirements-devices; see Struve, supra note 192, at 599–601
(describing the importance of postmarketing surveillance for latent issues).
239. See Struve, supra note 192, at 601–02. Certainly, postmarket studies, a good option
to ensure some degree of safety for self-learning AI machines, could be made public, as
Efthimios Parasidis has recommended. See Parasidis, supra note 194, at 935.
240. Allen, supra note 180. Even if the FDA has the resources to review algorithms, this
presupposes that such algorithms are both able to be meaningfully reviewed and are locked
rather than dynamic.
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dramatically reduced the potential for widespread patient injury.
For sophisticated medical device manufacturers, quality control
manufacturing procedures, and upfront design review processes
with experts in the field have improved patient confidence and
ultimately created a marketplace for these devices, spurring
economic growth.241
Medical devices reviewed by the FDA under a PMA are, by
definition, new and innovative technologies demanding expert
knowledge, and the FDA does not, and may not desire to have,
comprehensive expertise.242 The use of AI not only in diagnostic
software but also integrated into functioning medical device
software amplifies this knowledge demand because the rate of
technological change for AI software is so incredibly high. Even AI
experts cannot keep up with the variety of models and methods
created for AI, and the cost of complete FDA regulation meriting
broad preemption will likely lead to inefficiencies of cost and
availability delays inconsistent with innovation goals.
3. Consumer self-protection
From the perspective of consumer self-protection, labeling will
not be able to effectively advise physicians or patients of the risks.
If the FDA and AI experts cannot fully appreciate the extent of
potential risks, how will manufacturers knowledgeably
communicate risks to physicians and patients? FDA labeling
requirements not only identify approved uses (“on-label” uses) but
also provide specific warnings to prescribing physicians and, in
some cases, directly to patients. If FDA experts cannot anticipate or
understand potential cyber-kinetic risks or the potential for AI
design flaws due to the algorithm’s dynamic inscrutability, it is
unlikely these risks could be effectively communicated on a label in
a curative manner. It is unlikely that physicians, trained in a specific
241. In part, this may be explained not only by regulatory action, but also by standardsbearing organizations that collectively develop baseline standards, such as the International
Organization for Standards or the American National Standards Institute. See Paul H. Rubin,
Markets, Tort Law, and Regulation to Achieve Safety, 31 CATO J. 217, 222 (2011).
242. It should be noted that even if the FDA took a comprehensive stance on AI, the
reality is that the FDA cannot anticipate every safety issue, and the technology itself would
frustrate this model to some degree. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337–38 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the former chief counsel of the FDA: “Regulation cannot
protect against all possible injuries that might result from use of a device over time.
Preemption of all such claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer
protection . . . .”).
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field of medicine, would understand risks posed to their patients
by an algorithm.
Labeling also provides information to physicians and patients,
who rely on labels and associated marketing materials to compare
products. Although superficially AI technologies might appear to
pose the same challenges as device software, the ephemeral nature
of dynamically inscrutable AI makes labeling tasks nearly
impossible, dramatically reducing the ability of physicians to
advise patients of potential risks to make an informed decision. The
foundational problem for relying on patients and even physicians
to select safe products relates to information asymmetries both in
the PMA process and in practical expertise.243
Unlike general use consumer products, usually patients are
dependent on physicians’ expertise to recommend the appropriate
device and advise of potential risks. This relationship is so well
developed that courts apply a doctrine that prevents patients from
successfully bringing injury claims related to information in
labeling or warning, the learned intermediary doctrine. The learned
intermediary doctrine, recognized in a majority of states, prevents
patients from bringing these actions precisely because a physician
is responsible for explaining any risk to the patient and the patient
is not the audience for such warnings and labels.244
The physician likely has limited knowledge with respect to the
technology as well, especially for latent design defects that may not
appear obvious on the surface. For example, a physician who is
trained in remote surgery using CorPath may advise a patient of
the potential risks, but these risks will likely be related to the
surgery itself, rather than CorPath’s AI design and potential risks
related to the AI software itself. If CorPath includes a third party’s
design for the AI software, the manufacturer may not have fully
vetted or disclosed these details to the FDA.245 In other
243. See Rubin, supra note 241.
244. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (1966) (establishing the term
“learned intermediary”). The rationale for this doctrine usually involves the following:
(1) the physician is in a superior position to give a warning and can provide an independent
medical decision, (2) manufacturers lack effective means to communicate with the patient,
and (3) imposing a duty to warn upon the manufacturer would interfere with the physicianpatient relationship. See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Ky. 2004).
245. This notion is exemplified by what Paul Rubin calls a “Type 1 error,” or when
overregulation results when individuals are injured but an agency has been positioned as
primary regulator in a field. In this error, the injury prompts heavier regulation based on the
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circumstances, the FDA may have confidential information from
the manufacturer or third party from the PMA process, but those
details included in the PMA may not be available to physicians or
consumers. Regardless of whether the FDA, manufacturer, or third
party have the most information, physicians and patients are
comparatively in a less beneficial position to appropriately avoid
potential risks.246 The presence of AI amplifies the level of
information asymmetry under these circumstances due to the
algorithm’s dynamic inscrutability.
4. Injury risk
The aforementioned factors might have less bearing if AI
software posed little risk to patients. Unfortunately, AI software
and its infrastructure dramatically increase potential injury risks to
patients because medical device risk models have not taken into
account the risk of automation bias in human-interfaced AI
machines.247 Medical devices no longer pose risk solely due to their
inherent physical characteristics or installed in-device software. AI
infrastructure demands tremendous computing power through
distributed architectures, such as the cloud, internet connectivity,
and large and changing data sets. Dynamic inscrutability not only
is a moving target for purposes of understanding the technology’s
current risk profile, but the inscrutable nature of the algorithm
prevents even its creator from understanding the AI’s decision.
Increasingly more often, AI technologies do not rely on humans to
validate a recommendation and take action; the most cutting-edge
technologies, such as advanced surgical robotics, will make any
number of decisions for the user. While these technologies will
likely save lives, they may also introduce different, and sometimes
more serious, risks to patients.

expectation that the agency can or does have complete information to prevent injury. See
Rubin, supra note 241, at 227.
246. One lens for evaluating information asymmetries involves the economic
implications of competition between products. When information is available, consumers in
general might be better able to consider alternative options and perform their own costbenefit analyses. However, FDA-regulated markets are not competitive in the traditional
sense either, because usually few options are available for a given drug or device due to the
cost of entry in the market and the role of patent for establishing limited monopoly, amongst
others. See Stephen R. Munzer, Risk and Reward in Stem Cell Products: A New Model for Stem
Cell Product Liability, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 125–26 (2012).
247. See Gretton, supra note 80.
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C. The Existing FDA Review Structure Offers Opportunities for
Avoiding Preemption
When the FDA cannot effectively regulate a specific technology,
an opportunity exists for torts to complement the regulatory
structure and provide compensation to injured parties. In all
inquiries, courts would need to accept a micro, rather than macro,
view of risk-benefit decisions. This means that courts would need
to examine each case as a specific risk-based inquiry by the FDA.
Practically speaking, courts could not “write off” a lack of review
or insufficient review as part of a systematic risk calculus for the
medical device industry as a whole. This model works well for AI
software-enabled medical devices, but the three-part inquiry
described in the remainder of this section could also reinforce FDA
regulatory efficacy for other technology innovations while
simultaneously providing some compensation for parties injured
in the name of innovation.
There is plenty of reason to believe that Congress intended for
plaintiffs to have some right of recovery, the least of which because
they did not explicitly bar any recovery. As Justice Ginsburg noted
in her Riegel dissent:
Congress’ inclusion of a preemption clause in the MDA was not
motivated by concern that similar state tort actions could be
mounted regarding medical devices. Rather, Congress included
§ 360k(a) and (b) to empower the FDA to exercise control over
state premarket approval systems installed at a time when there
was no preclearance at the federal level.248

Without more specific MDA preemption language, it would be
“difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse.”249 Although the FDA has
been positioned as a central regulator under the MDA and the
agency must “weig[h] any probable benefit to health from the use
of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such
use,”250 it does not necessarily follow that recovery is all but
foreclosed. The Buckman decision, however, has opened up the
potential for the Court to find implied preemption under certain

248. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340–41 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 337 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
250. Id. at 318 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(2)(C)).
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circumstances, which could become a slippery slope effectively
amounting to field preemption.251 It is centrally important for AI
software that at least some opportunity to recover is permitted in
circumstances where the FDA has not developed the appropriate
expertise, when truncated processes are used, or, due to the
technology itself, when the FDA cannot effectively and
comprehensively regulate.
Although the preemption trilogy may not leave much room for
avoiding preemption, the existing FDA review structure,
regulatory design, and the degree of similarity or difference from
the submitted technology may offer some opportunity for success
in surviving summary judgment.252 A three-part inquiry for claims,
focused on Lohr’s recognition of a parallel claim preemption
exception, would likely offer a more complete review than
indiscriminately applied preemption, and dismissal ab initio, would
provide.253

251. Although the Court recognized implied preemption under a conflict preemption
analysis, it is possible to envision an argument for field preemption, due to the
comprehensive nature of FDA reviews. Drug cases offer a more likely candidate for field
preemption, due to the non-existence of express preemption language for drugs while the
MDA does contain such language. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of
State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 55 (2008). Nevertheless, without
due care by the courts, scope creep regarding conflict preemption could practically result in
field preemption, even under the MDA.
252. This section does not attempt to fully describe how a prima facie case could be
successfully argued or how, for example, expertise should be solicited or judgments fulfilled.
Rather, this section has one aim: to demonstrate how a plaintiff injured by an AI machine
might successfully avoid preemption under the MDA. Indeed, this section follows the
relatively clear direction from Lohr in its presumption that parallel claims are not completely
foreclosed under implied preemption, both based on the Court’s reasoning and on the
practical realities of the FDA’s actual documentation related to AI and its broad regulatory
scope. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996).
253. This is no trivial task. Courts are split on the question of parallel claims, despite
recognition in Lohr and Riegel. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, have
demonstrated a more liberal view of parallel claims, whereas the Eighth Circuit has held that
such claims are expressly preempted if the plaintiff cannot definitely demonstrate a federal
claim specifically referring to the device. See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and
Preemption: A Defense of Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA
Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1207–14 (2011). In Tarloff’s view, for both doctrinal and
public policy reasons, courts should adopt a more flexible definition of requirements. Id. at
1219. From a regulatory-tort allocation perspective, parallel claims support a compensatory
model of consumer protection and complement the FDA’s regulatory function. Id. at 1219–
26.
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1. Structural inquiry
The structure of FDA reviews could offer an opportunity for
courts to resolve tort actions in favor of surviving summary
judgment. First, the principle thrust of Lohr was to distinguish
between resource-intensive reviews where the FDA had fully
reviewed a particular medical device in a PMA process and more
passive reviews, like the 510(k) process. The introduction of new,
abbreviated reviews could increase the speed to device access. For
example, the FDA’s De Novo review takes devices that would
normally go through a full PMA process and instead permits a
truncated review more similar to the 510(k) process for devices that,
in the manufacturer’s view, do not present substantial risk.254 The
software self-certification process and discussion paper prescribe a
system-level or manufacturer review process, rather than a designfocused process, for AI diagnostic software.255 In these cases, courts
should continue to uphold Lohr’s outcome: that anything short of a
full review should be preempted. Without a more severe approach
to restricting preemption, it is possible that some slippage could
occur, resulting in preemption of truncated review processes.
In a similar vein, the Shuker decision has marked another
opportunity for courts to consider the impact of preemption
slippage for component parts.256 In Shuker, the Third Circuit, in
acknowledging that the part of a device that caused injury was
independently reviewed via the PMA process, also noted that for
entire device systems, components are usually listed within the
PMA process for review.257 Although this was not the case in
question, it raises important issues of the role components play
within systems that have been reviewed by the FDA.258
Because AI will likely be considered a module of larger systems,
the risk of slippage for these systems is quite high. It is not hard to
imagine that a defendant medical device manufacturer might assert
254. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DESIGNATION
(DE NOVO) (2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/
evaluation-automatic-class-iii-designation-de-novo (showing the De Novo review process).
255. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 84.
256. See Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, 885 F.3d 760 (2017).
257. Id. at 766.
258. Although for purposes of this Article, the Author focuses on PMA-approved
processes that may include 510(k) approved components, which is most likely for AI
systems, certainly the reverse arrangement might also complicate medical device tort
litigation.

1609

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

preemption for AI injuries if an entire AI machine has been
reviewed under a PMA, even if the AI infrastructure, as a
component part, received a 510(k). For injuries implicating specific
components, courts could instead examine whether the component
itself was reviewed via a separate PMA process and, if not, whether
the manufacturer can demonstrate a comprehensive review of the
component as part of the system that received premarket approval.
Although this approach might require a manufacturer to reveal
confidential information from the FDA approval process to
determine the degree of component re-review under the PMA, it
might be reasonable to expect such a showing to preempt tort
claims under these circumstances.259
For example, if the bionic pancreas’s AI software malfunctions
and causes injury, the court would first look to determine whether
a full PMA had been conducted on the bionic pancreas as a system.
After that had been verified, the court would next determine
whether the AI software component that caused injury was
reviewed as part of the bionic pancreas system PMA, whether the
AI software was reviewed in a separate device PMA, or whether
the AI software was classified separately and was not
independently reviewed as part of the bionic pancreas system
PMA. If one of the first two conditions is met, the court could verify
that the structural inquiry was satisfied. If the third circumstance
applies and the software component is alleged to have caused the
injury, tort claims would not be preempted.
2. Design inquiry
Both Lohr and Riegel hinged on preemption language in the
MDA preempting state laws with “different or additional
requirements.” In both cases, the Court focused on the process of
the PMA versus the 510(k) as providing sufficient requirements for
purposes of preemption. However, the Court did not go into great
detail, in either case, of what could qualify as requirements, nor did
it examine the veracity of such requirement review by the FDA.
Construing requirements in a more inclusive definition and
259. This approach might also reasonably balance stricter pleadings standards
advanced by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which likely has made bringing products liability suits for
medical device injuries much more difficult given the confidentiality of the FDAmanufacturer process. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). If plaintiffs must meet
heightened pleadings standards, manufacturers may need to demonstrate more to escape
liability.
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requiring demonstration of actual review might tighten a fairly
loose preemption standard via the parallel claims exception.260
As an initial matter, both Lohr and Riegel left open the possibility
of recovery under parallel claims despite Justice Scalia’s skepticism
regarding a jury’s ability to determine an appropriate cost-benefit
model in Riegel’s comparatively more preemption-friendly
majority opinion.261 Parallel claims, established under Lohr, permit
plaintiffs to avoid MDA preemption by demonstrating that their
injury resulted from non-compliance with a federal requirement.
For purposes of plaintiff recovery, especially for technologies that
are not yet comprehensively regulated under traditional CFR
requirements due to a lack of expertise, the definition of
“requirement” should be construed broadly.
It is well known that often the FDA considers not only special
controls but also guidance as it reviews the PMA file. If a plaintiff
can demonstrate that the manufacturer did not adhere to guidance,
and the FDA has developed guidance on AI and software topics, it
may be possible for a plaintiff to recover.262 Courts could also look
to broad language in the special controls, such as the example given
earlier in this Article, “adequate consideration of privacy and
security issues in the system design,” to permit further inquiry
beyond a motion to dismiss and summary judgment. 263 This
inquiry might enable a plaintiff to determine, in discovery,
whether a manufacturer did or did not adequately consider
such issues in its design of an AI-enabled medical device.
Where language is broadly written, the FDA and other experts
could explain what compliance with that language would
entail. This model cabins potential conversations by
restricting them within the Lohr parallel claims exception,
while maintaining the exception’s breadth to maximize fact-

260. This model is consistent with Catherine Sharkey’s agency reference model,
wherein details of the FDA’s views would be useful in determining the compatibility of these
views with state law tort claims and would necessarily include some deference to the FDA’s
position on certain matters. See Sharkey, supra note 194, at 418. Although Sharkey directs this
conversation at the largely unaddressed area of implied preemption, the concept can easily
be integrated into express preemption analysis.
261. See Sharkey, supra note 194, at 417–18 (quoting Justice Scalia’s majority opinion).
262. Guidance is often positioned as the FDA’s most current views on a topic and is
tied to special controls. Although not legally binding, it could be used as an interpretive tool
for understanding often broadly written special controls and industry reasonableness in
implementing such controls.
263. See supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text.
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specific inquiry and relying on institutional statutory
interpretation.
A parallel claim inquiry could be further reinforced by
permitting a fact-specific inquiry, based on FDA documentation,
into whether a specific requirement has been reviewed. In most
preemption cases, the successful approval of a medical device via
the PMA process does not go much further to demonstrate
preemption. However, if the court views its role in tort as ensuring
appropriate safety for patients, it could engage in a more factspecific inquiry to determine whether the FDA factually reviewed
a design requirement that ultimately led to patient injury. For
example, evidence of a review could include specific sheets
requiring disclosure of information related to the requirement (e.g.,
a “checklist”), versions of PMA documentation illustrating changes
to a specific design element, or copies of FDA correspondence on
the topic. Although this would likely demand resources from the
FDA and the manufacturer to demonstrate the FDA’s actual
review, this model could be used to better probe the validity of the
parallel claim argument.264 In this model, manufacturers and the
FDA could not make an argument of confidentiality while
simultaneously arguing for preemptive effect.
Functionally, the court would conduct a secondary analysis
from the perspective of validating the parallel claims in
requirement and actual review only if the first inquiry, the
structural inquiry, supports preemption. The court would first look
to the existence of some requirement, construed in favor of the
plaintiff, to support the claim. The court’s direction, then, would
construe a common law negligence action as a type of negligence
per se claim, wherein the basis for duty and breach is established
through a type of institutional comity.265
For example, if a plaintiff alleges negligence due to a bionic
pancreas’s malfunction or poor design, the court would look to
special controls and guidance to determine whether these
264. A parallel claims model could actually cut both ways: if the FDA did review a
given requirement, the plaintiffs would be preempted in their claims. If the FDA did not
review a given requirement, the plaintiffs would still need to prove the remainder of their
prima facie case to recover.
265. Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957, 965 (2014).
The benefit to deferring to standing regulatory standards, at least from a parallel claims
perspective, is that the torts system, then, can be reinforcing rather than competitive with
regimes that have an institutional advantage. Id. at 967. It might also draw additional
attention to the insufficiency of existing standards, prompting the FDA to take action.
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documents apply to the AI used in the bionic pancreas. If such
documents, broadly construed, exist, the court would then conduct
a fact-specific inquiry into whether the FDA reviewed the device’s
design with respect to these requirements. If the FDA sufficiently
reviewed the design for specific safety considerations, courts could
uphold preemption. If the FDA did not sufficiently review these
requirements, the court could deny any preemption defense, which
would balance regulatory and compensatory interests in the
parallel claims context.266 Although this may not be a perfect
solution for plaintiffs, it rewards good regulatory behavior and
promotes effective investment in upfront processes.
3. Technology inquiry
The AI technology itself may also provide an opportunity for
plaintiffs to successfully survive preemption. In the third prong of
inquiry, courts should evaluate whether the technology that
allegedly caused the injury has changed materially from the
technology reviewed in the PMA, and whether the manufacturer
timely submitted a required PMA supplement. For AI, this analysis
would likely involve reviewing the type of AI used when the
plaintiff sustained an injury. Ultimately, not all AI is alike: some AI
software may be designed using test data and refined in clinical
trials, only to be launched in that form for the medical device. These
locked forms of AI software are, by definition, static rather than
dynamic. If the FDA has actually reviewed these devices in a full
PMA process and requirements have been applied to the AI, these
devices likely pose less risk for patients.
However, if software or other technologies are designed to be
dynamic on an ongoing basis, as is common in unsupervised
machine learning AI and most neural networks, the court could
presume that the technology is different from its approved form.
Then, the court could shift the burden to the manufacturer to
demonstrate that the device is not different from its approved form.
If the manufacturer successfully demonstrates a lack of material
change, the manufacturer would survive the proposed prong three
inquiry. If the manufacturer does not, plaintiffs will survive

266. The goal in an effective compensatory model is not necessarily to always provide
compensation but to ensure appropriate cost-benefit analyses have been conducted and that
safety measures have been considered.
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preemption and will be permitted to bring claims, assuming such
claims meet pleading requirements.
The question of material change has a crucially important
impact for FDA medical device preemption. If the medical device
or device component has changed so substantially that it could be
a newly functioning device yet is similar to its predecessors, it
would be treated as a substantially equivalent (SE) device for
purposes of initial FDA review. Under an SE review, the FDA
would likely require a limited 510(k) submission, which, according
to Lohr, would not preempt later tort recovery. While in practice, a
manufacturer could submit a PMA supplement to amend the initial
PMA report, courts could create a legal fiction of 510(k) status. If a
510(k) status exists, plaintiff claims are not preempted. There is
some technical justification and background that could support this
kind of legal fiction. First, manufacturers are starting to release AI
machines that are next generation versions of analog and non-AIenabled medical devices, outfitted with new AI infrastructure.267 In
many cases, these may be submitted as 510(k) submissions because
the manufacturer has argued for substantial equivalence to a
predicate device. This fiction could inform court behavior when the
physical device has not been altered but the AI has effectively
changed device functionality.
Alternatively, if the medical device changed materially, the
manufacturer would have needed to submit a PMA supplement,
which would have been reviewed by the FDA. If the manufacturer
did not submit such a supplement, the FDA would not have
reviewed the device at issue, referring this third prong back to the
second prong of inquiry, where likely the FDA would not have
actually reviewed the design against the requirement.
Both of these approaches address an important issue noted in
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Riegel, that “[t]he Court’s holding does
not reach an important issue outside the bounds of this case: the
preemptive effect of § 360k(a) where evidence of a medical device’s
defect comes to light only after the device receives premarket
approval.”268 Although not specifically contemplating AI

267. See Allen, supra note 180.
268. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 n.1 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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dynamism, latent defects and fast-track technology innovation
certainly would trigger this important question.269
D. The Viability of Tort Actions Requires Further Inquiry
By focusing on the challenging space of preemption for
innovative technologies, this Article has not addressed the
potential viability of tort actions, such as products liability actions,
specifically for AI software. Although scholars are beginning to
examine the challenges and potential solutions for successfully
arguing these cases, the area of AI software torts should receive
additional attention. Initial areas of inquiry could include the
relative responsibility of manufacturers for their AI software when
the algorithm itself is inscrutable, contributory negligence in the
form of patient-operated AI-enabled medical devices, or the
challenges in discovery due to algorithmic complexity,
inscrutability, or trade secrecy. Importantly, the inscrutability of
medical device AI causes specific problems for successfully
demonstrating proximate cause.
CONCLUSION
AI and other innovative technologies like it inherently
complicate regulatory-tort allocation: manufacturers are not
required to demonstrate that AI-enabled medical devices will
adequately prevent consumer injury in the clearance process, yet it
is likely that consumers will also not be able to recover for their
injuries in tort, either. The equation, therefore, is not remotely what
Congress aimed for in the MDA’s passage. The FDA’s reluctance
and lack of expertise in this area, as well as software’s inherent
qualities, such as its dynamic inscrutability and reliance on
distributed systems, makes a comprehensive and effective ex ante
solution nearly impossible for innovative, adaptive technologies.
The tort system is an integral part of both effective safety
regimes and consumer injury compensation. An effective
regulatory-tort system for new technology, including AI-enabled
269. Catherine Sharkey has also identified this issue with respect to pharmaceutical
labeling defects, where the label is nonetheless incorrect after a latent design issue comes to
light. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Drug Advertising Claims: Preemption’s New Frontier, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1646 (2008). The question of labeling versus design defects for purposes of
preemption is an important distinction given how the courts have responded to labeling
issues for products (more likely to preempt) than for design defects, assuming such defects
can be sufficiently narrowly tailored to a federal requirement.

1615

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

medical devices, balances interests of manufacturers and
consumers through effective regulation and opportunities for
recovery when regulatory solutions fail. Courts can champion new
technology development by permitting legitimate parallel claims in
the AI-enabled medical device context, which may change
medicine for the better, all while reinforcing consumer confidence.
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